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I. INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, genetics researchers around the globe launched an 
ambitious scientific endeavor: the Human Genome Project. Fueled by 
billions of dollars of research funds from the U.S. Congress, by other 
countries’ public coffers, and by venture capital from biotechnology 
companies around the world, the Human Genome Project’s goal was to 
sequence all genes in the human body1 in order to facilitate the development 
of diagnostic tests and treatments for over five thousand diseases2 with a 
genetic basis.3 
The Human Genome Project (HGP or the Project) has not been without 
its detractors, some of whom have labeled it the “Manhattan Project” of 
biology.4 The 1997 film GATTACA, which even used a genetic sequence as 
its title, captured the dark side of the endeavor.5 In GATTACA, human 
personal and social decisions about people are made based on their genes.6 In 
the movie, one’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), rather than one’s education, 
aptitude, or drive, dictates one’s profession and determines one’s place in the 
social structure.7 As internationally renowned gene therapy researcher W. 
French Anderson said of the movie, “This is what the future will look like 
unless lawyers do something soon.”8 
GATTACA is not just a science fiction fantasy. By the time it was 
released, numerous companies had already begun collecting genetic 
information on their employees,9 sometimes surreptitiously.10 Some insurers 
 1. Victor A. McKusick, Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
910, 910-13 (1989). See also LORI ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 184 (1999) [hereinafter ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE]. 
 2. See, e.g., VICTOR A. MCKUSICK, MENDELIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN: CATALOGS OF 
AUTOSOMAL DOMINANT, AUTOSOMAL RECESSIVE, AND X-LINKED PHENOTYPES xvi (9th ed. 1990). 
 3. See McKusick, supra note 1. 
 4. George J. Annas, Who’s Afraid of the Human Genome?, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
July/Aug. 1989, at 19. The Manhattan Project was a gathering of scientists in Los Alamos, New 
Mexico, in the 1940s to develop the atomic bomb. G. PASCAL ZACHARY, ENDLESS FRONTIER: 
VANNEVAR BUSH, ENGINEER OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1997). 
 5. GATTACA (Sony Pictures 1997). See Chris Kridler, “GATTACA” Nice Dip in Gene Pool, 
BALT. SUN, Oct. 24, 1997, at 1E. 
 6. GATTACA (Sony Pictures 1997). See Janet Maslin, The Next Bigotry: Privilege By Genetic 
Perfection, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1997, at 18E. 
 7. GATTACA (Sony Pictures 1997). 
 8. W. French Anderson, Remarks at the International Conference on Mammalian Cloning (June 
26, 1997). See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Genetic Future Both Tantalizing and Disturbing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000, at E7. 
 9. See infra note 325 and accompanying text (discussing the American Management 
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denied insurance to healthy people either because genetic testing indicated 
they might become ill later in life11 or because they had a relative with a 
genetic disease.12 
Despite the potential for abuses with genetics and despite its historical 
misuse in the eugenics movements in Germany, the United States, and 
elsewhere,13 no comprehensive legal policy exists for regulating genetics. 
Legal questions abound regarding whether certain genetic services should be 
forbidden (such as the testing of minor children for late-onset diseases) or 
should be required (such as mandatory genetic testing by schools, insurers, 
employers, or public health officials).14 
This Article presents the first attempt to develop a comprehensive legal 
framework governing the regulation of genetic information in the United 
States.15 Part II addresses the need for such legal framework. Part III 
analyzes three conceptual legal models that have been adopted in the past for 
regulating medical services: the medical model, the public health model, and 
the fundamental rights model. Part IV examines the results of medical and 
social scientific studies on the impact of genetic services. Part V addresses 
the impact of genetic services. Part VI revisits the three models to determine 
which is appropriate for genetics. Part VII discusses the legal justification for 
the fundamental rights model.  
II. THE NEED FOR A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
From the beginning, participants in the HGP recognized the detrimental 
implications and potential for abuse of genetic information. In an 
extraordinary move, the first director of the project, Nobel Laureate James 
Watson, allocated three to five percent of the Project’s scientific budget to 
Association survey, which indicates that thirty percent of medium- and large-sized companies collect 
genetic information on employees). 
 10. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 11. See infra notes 288-311 and accompanying text (discussing insurance discrimination). 
 12. See E. Virginia Lapham et al., Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives of Consumers, 274 SCI. 
621, 622 (1996). 
 13. See, e.g., DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USE OF 
HUMAN HEREDITY (1985). 
 14. See Lori B. Andrews, Gen-Etiquette: Are There Moral and Legal Responsibilities to Share 
Genetic Information Within Families?,” in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 263 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997). 
 15. The pressing need for this Article’s analysis is underscored by the announcement in June 
2000 that private and public researchers had completed a rough draft of the sequence of the entire 
human genome. See Rick Weiss & Justin Gillis, Teams Finish Mapping Human DNA; Clinton, 
Scientists Celebrate “Working Draft” of Human Genetic Blueprint, WASH. POST, June 27, 2000, at 
A1. 
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fund studies of the ethical, legal, and social implications of the Project.16 
These studies provide a basis for determining the most appropriate policies to 
implement. Although researchers are providing the map to the human 
genome, it will be up to lawyers and other policymakers to determine where 
that map will lead. 
Everyday, hundreds of policy decisions are made in genetics, such as 
whether a particular test should be offered, what information should be 
provided in advance of a test, and who should have access to the results of 
the test.17 Some of those decisions are most appropriately made by 
individuals, health care providers, or business organizations, while others 
should be addressed by professional or trade organization guidelines or 
formal laws or regulations. No matter at what level the issues are approached, 
all decision makers need a framework for the policies they promulgate and a 
way of predicting the likely impact of their decisions. 
Genetic technologies are already embedded in our culture. Prenatal 
genetic testing, which assesses the health status of a fetus, has been used for 
nearly three decades, and the range of disorders being diagnosed has 
expanded exponentially. Prenatal testing is now possible not just for serious 
disorders,18 but also for less serious disorders, diseases that are treatable after 
birth, for disorders that do not manifest until later in life (such as breast 
cancer or the debilitating neurological disorder, Huntington’s disease), and 
even for conditions that are not medical problems, such as homosexuality.19 
Already, couples have sought genetic testing for Alzheimer’s disease in their 
fetuses, intending to abort even though the child could have seventy or eighty 
years of a normal life before manifesting any symptoms of the disease.20 
Genetic testing has evolved from its focus on reproductive risks to 
become a major component of general health care. Increasing numbers of 
healthy people are tested for diseases that will not manifest until later in life, 
creating a new class of individuals referred to as the asymptomatic ill.21 For 
 16. See ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE HUMAN 
GENOME 161-85 (1994). 
 17. For example, the four million women who are pregnant each year face the decision of 
whether to have amniocentesis; 2.5 million do so. National Center for Health Statistics, Obstetrical 
Procedures, at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastas/obgyn.htm (last visited May 5, 2001). 
 18. An example of a disorder that most people consider to be serious is Tay-Sachs disease. Tay-
Sachs disease is a fatal neurodegenerative disorder caused by a genetic mutation. It is very common 
among Ashkenazi Jews. See, e.g., Eleanor C. Landels et al., Frequency of the Tay-Sachs Disease 
Splice and Insertion Mutations in the UK Ashkenazi Jewish Population, 28 J. MED. GENETICS 177-80 
(1991). 
 19. See MCKUSICK, supra note 2. 
 20. Bryan Christie, The Human Map, SCOTSMAN, May 13, 1996, at 14. 
 
 21. See, e.g., Bryce A. Lenox, Comment, Genetic Discrimination in Insurance and Employment: 
Spoiled Fruits of the Human Genome Project, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 189, 196 (1997). 
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some diseases, having a genetic mutation means that the person will almost 
certainly develop the disease. But other mutations only slightly increase the 
possibility that the person will fall ill.22 With such uncertainty, it is difficult 
for a person to determine how to incorporate this new information into his or 
her life.  
The meaning of genetic tests varies widely. There are single gene 
disorders for which environmental factors or other genes may increase or 
decrease the likelihood that the disease will actually express itself.23 In 
scientific terms, such mutations are not fully “penetrant,” that is, not 
everyone with the genetic mutation will manifest the disorder.24 Often the 
gene indicates only a predisposition to a problem, and it takes an additional 
intervention, such as a particular environmental exposure, to trigger the 
condition.25 
Even for disorders that are completely penetrant, it is impossible to 
predict how severe the disease will be or when it will strike. Even though the 
average age of onset for Huntington’s disease is between thirty and fifty, 
children as young as two have been symptomatic of the disease, while other 
people have not manifested symptoms until their late seventies.26 Similarly, 
some people with genetic mutations, such as the cystic fibrosis mutation, 
have such a mild manifestation of the disease (or even no symptoms 
whatsoever) that they never realize they have the disease.27 Others with the 
same genetic profile may have serious health problems.28 
A. The Ethical Differences Between Genetics and Other Medical Realms 
Genetics shares many features with other medical fields, but it also has 
several unique features that raise concerns about its impact on people’s lives. 
First, genetics often plays a central role in people’s lives. Because genes are 
usually viewed as immutable and essential to the determination of a person’s 
identity, information about genetic predispositions may cause a person to 
 22. Bernadine Healy, BRCA Genes: Bookmaking, Fortunetelling, and Medical Care, 336 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1448-49 (1997). 
 23. Robert Wachbroit, Biotechnology and the Law: Making the Grade: Testing for Human 
Genetic Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 587-88 (1988). 
 24. Rhydian Hapgood, Essential Genetics for General Practice, PULSE, Jan. 8, 2000, at 44. 
 25. Wachbroit, supra note 23, at 588. 
 26. Raymund A.C. Roos et al., Age at Onset in Huntington’s Disease: Effect of Line of 
Inheritance and Patient’s Sex, 28 J. MED. GENETICS 515-15 (1991). 
 27. See, e.g., Patrik S. Florencio, Genetics, Parenting, and Child’s Rights in the Twenty-First 
Century, 45 MCGILL L.J. 527, 536-37 (2000). 
 28. See generally D.R. Gill et al., A Placebo-Controlled Study of Liposome-Mediated Gene 
Transfer to the Nasal Epithelium of Patients with Cystic Fibrosis, 4 GENE THER. 199 (1997). 
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change his or her self-perception and may cause others to treat that person 
differently.29 Second, people may undergo genetic testing or therapy without 
sufficient advance consideration of its potential effects.30 In most instances, 
people seek medical services because they are already ill. However, 
biomedical companies and physicians have an incentive to heavily market 
predictive genetic testing, and, as a result, healthy people undergoing testing 
may not consider the psychological, social, and financial impact of learning 
genetic information about themselves before they agree to genetic testing. As 
one group of cancer researchers observed with respect to genetic testing, 
“[S]ociety’s technological capabilities have outpaced its understanding of the 
psychological consequences.”31 
The therapeutic gap creates another problem to consider. Many diseases 
can be diagnosed through genetic testing, but few can be treated successfully. 
This gap presents enormous social and financial implications because an 
individual’s health insurer may drop him or her based on a genetic test 
result.32 It also exposes potentially risky medical implications. While genetic 
treatment and preventive strategies for asymptomatic individuals are being 
developed, positive results on a genetic test may lead to interventions that are 
costly, unnecessary, ineffective, or even harmful.33 A woman who has a 
mutation in her breast cancer gene may have both her breasts surgically 
removed although she would never have developed cancer, for example. 
Genetics has another unique feature. Genetic testing of a particular 
individual also reveals genetic risk information about his or her relatives. A 
parent and a child have half their genes in common, as do siblings.34 Cousins 
share one-quarter of their genes, as do grandparents and grandchildren.35 The 
acquisition and disclosure of genetic information raise new and profound 
questions of “gen-etiquette”,36 questions about the moral obligations owed to 
relatives. If a woman learns she has a genetic mutation predisposing her to 
breast cancer, does she have a moral or even a legal duty to share that 
information with her sister? What about an estranged cousin? 
In the past, genetic testing was generally used like other clinical testing—
 29. See infra notes 132-201 and accompanying text. 
 30. Lori Andrews et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274 
JAMA 1786 (1995) [hereinafter Andrews et al., Informed Consent]. 
 31. Andrew Baum et al., Stress and Genetic Testing for Disease Risk, 16 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 8, 9 
(1997). 
 32. See insurance discussion infra Part V.D. 
 33. See Andrews et al., Informed Consent, supra note 30. 
 34. Stanton Peele & Richard DeGrandpre, My Genes Made Me Do It, PSYCHOL. TODAY, July-
Aug. 1995, at 50-53, 62-68. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Andrews, supra note 14. 
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in situations in which the patient was symptomatic or the patient’s family 
history, age, or ethnic background suggested a particular risk.37 Now genetic 
testing is suggested for the population at large to predict future diseases.38 
The idea seems seductively simple: one can look into the medical crystal 
ball, see one’s future diseases, and try to prevent them. The reality is much 
more complicated, however. For most complex disorders, the genetic test 
gives ambiguous results.39 Prevention and treatment strategies are uncertain 
as well.40 Some diseases, such as Huntington’s disease, have no known cures 
and lead to certain debilitation and death.41 Learning this information may 
cause a person to give up on his or her future or be alienated from or rejected 
by social institutions such as professional schools, insurers, or employers.42  
Genetic technologies influence our lives in a variety of ways, with 
profound effects. Yet there is no comprehensive policy framework for 
regulating such technologies. The genetics policies adopted thus far generally 
deal with specific, isolated genetics issues, such as the use of a particular type 
of genetic test (for example, cystic fibrosis carrier screening43 or breast 
cancer testing44) or the subsequent use of test results by a particular type of 
third party (for example, employers or insurers45). The scholarly articles, too, 
usually focus on a particular application of the technology or a particular 
legal or ethical issue. Little attempt has been made to create an overall 
conceptual framework to regulate genetics. 
Creating an overall framework would serve several useful functions. 
Analyzing alternative conceptual frameworks for genetics policy provides an 
opportunity to understand better the values that undergird professional and 
public policies in this area by allowing a closer scrutiny of the principles 
underlying specific policies. It transforms what may seem like an isolated 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See generally Jeffrey P. Struewing et al., The Risk of Cancer Associated with Specific 
Mutations of BRCA1 and BRCA2 Among Ashkenazi Jews, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401 (1997). 
 40. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins, BRCA1—Lots of Mutations, Lots of Dilemmas, 334 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 186, 187 (1996). 
 41. See generally Virginia Morell, Huntington’s Gene Finally Found, SCI., Apr. 2, 1993, at 28. 
 42. See discussion infra Part V.D. 
 43. Cystic fibrosis is caused by a disorder of exocrine glands and is thought to be the most 
common, potentially fatal, genetic disease among Caucasians. Individuals with cystic fibrosis may 
have a variety of physical abnormalities. The most serious among these is chronic obstructive lung 
disease. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., HEALTHY CHILDREN: INVESTING IN THE FUTURE 
263 (1988) [hereinafter HEALTHY CHILDREN]. 
 44. See National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research, Statement on Use of DNA 
Testing for Pre-Symptomatic Identification of Cancer Risks, 271 JAMA 785 (1994). 
 45. See, e.g., Karen H. Rothenberg, Genetic Information and Health Insurance: State Legislative 
Approaches, 23 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 312 (1995). 
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individual case (e.g., should Aunt Millie be told that she, too, might have a 
gene predisposing her to breast cancer?) into a larger category of cases (e.g., 
to what extent should scientists, physicians, and policymakers facilitate 
people learning about their genetic make-up?). In addition, by assessing how 
alternative conceptual frameworks would address genetics issues where 
policies have not yet been adopted, the enterprise provides a basis for 
developing more forward-looking policies that can be readily invoked to 
handle new technologies or new issues, rather than relying on reactive 
policies to deal only with current crises.46 
The need for a framework with respect to genetics policy issues was 
raised by Robert Blank in his book Regulating Reproduction, where he noted 
that “by concentrating on one or several applications, the cumulative impact 
of reproductive and genetic technologies is obscured.”47 Blank observed that 
the “fragmented [American] policy-making process and its tendency to focus 
on immediate, conspicuous problems has led to a failure to provide 
systematic, comprehensive assessment of the technologies or their 
implications for society.”48 
When technologies are introduced incrementally and when policies are 
adopted to deal with a few isolated issues at a time, there is less opportunity 
to stimulate a social debate about whether society is moving in the direction 
that people would like to go.49 Some commentators criticize what they 
labeled the “extemporaneous” manner in which genetics policy has been 
made in the United States.50 They argue in favor of using an “evidentiary” 
approach incorporating an evaluation of research and attention to underlying 
normative issues.51 Their focus is on clinical medical research, but it is 
important to consider research from a wider variety of disciplines, such as 
anthropology, sociology, philosophy, history, and linguistics. 
 46. The biomedical policy area is replete with examples of policy that does not get adopted until 
there is a visible public case and the policy that is adopted is not very helpful because it is narrowly 
tailored to the facts of that case. In the early 1980s, for example, a number of legislatures considered 
bills that would have dealt with surrogate motherhood in a comprehensive fashion. See, e.g., LORI B. 
ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS, 
INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 
237-41 (1985) (describing proposed Michigan law). However, it was not until after the much-
publicized Baby M case that lawmakers began to adopt laws in this area, and the laws were only 
tailored to the problems raised by the one case. See LORI ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: 
SURROGATE MOTHERS, EXPECTANT FATHERS, & BRAVE NEW BABIES (1989). 
 47. ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 139 (1990). 
 48. Id. at 180. 
 49. See MARQUE-LUISA MIRINGOFF, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF GENETIC WELFARE 25-27 (1991). 
 50. See Benjamin S. Wilfond & Kathleen Nolan, National Policy Development for the Clinical 
Application of Genetic Diagnostic Technologies, 270 JAMA 2948 (1993). 
 51. Id. 
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III. THREE PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
Genetic technologies raise issues that cut to the core of what it means to 
be human and what it means to be a just and fair society. The significance of 
those technologies, however, has not been addressed in a systematic way by 
policymakers in the United States. Instead, a chaotic series of 
pronouncements by differt agencies, medical organizations, health care 
institutions, and legislatures has addressed narrow issues or isolated 
subcategories of genetic technologies. The result has been unnecessary 
duplication of effort, conflicting guidelines, and specialized policies that can 
cause harm when applied in an inappropriately wide manner. 
Concerns about appropriate uses of certain genetic technologies have 
been addressed by a variety of professional and governmental entities,52 
including the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH)/Department of Energy Working Group 
on the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Program of the Human 
Genome Project,53 the National Bioethics Advisory Commission,54 the (now-
defunct) Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) of the U.S. Congress,55 
and professional organizations such as the American Society of Human 
Genetics56 and the American College of Medical Genetics.57 These entities 
have addressed each issue with ad hoc committees meeting for limited 
periods of time, without a mechanism for situating the subject they are 
addressing within a larger social context. In addition, these entities are 
usually reactive, springing into action once a particular technology has been 
developed. The discovery of the genetic mutation associated with cystic 
fibrosis, for example, initiated a series of policy deliberations about the use of 
 52. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 290-307 
(Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS]. 
 53. See National Action Plan on Breast Cancer & the NIH-DOE Working Group on Ethical, 
Legal, and Social Implications of Human Genome Research, Genetic Discrimination and Health 
Insurance: A Case Study on Breast Cancer (July 11, 1995) (presentation at conference in Bethesda, 
MD) (on file with author) [hereinafter Conference on Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance]. 
 54. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 
(1997). 
 55. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., HUMAN GENE THERAPY (1984); 
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE 
WORKPLACE (1990) [hereinafter GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING]. 
 56. See C. Thomas Cashey et al., American Society of Human Genetics Statement on Cystic 
Fibrosis Screening, 46 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 393 (1990). 
 57. See AM. COLL. OF MED. GENETICS STORAGE OF GENETICS MATERIALS COMM., Statement on 
Storage and Use of Genetic Materials, 57 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1499 (1995). 
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the cystic fibrosis test by professional organizations, the NIH, and the OTA.58 
These efforts have suffered from several deficiencies. Some groups have 
been influenced by the governmental or professional organizations that 
formed them and have not adequately represented the public.59 Other 
committees made guidelines in a vacuum with neither adequate staffing nor a 
mechanism to collect data to assess the impact of their proposed guidelines. 
Still others addressed only the physical risks of proposed procedures, not the 
social values at stake.  
Limiting the parameters of inquiry overlooks the fact that studies find that 
“risk is less significant than moral acceptability in shaping public perceptions 
of biotechnology.”60 Consequently, members of the public “do not find the 
language of objective risk assessment adequate, arguing that risks are 
fundamentally moral and political.”61 Moreover, efforts to date often failed to 
address the real life situations in which people make decisions about 
genetics. For example, the OTA report about genetic testing for cystic 
fibrosis provided elaborate economic formulas about the cost savings to 
society if women aborted fetuses affected with cystic fibrosis.62 However, the 
formulas ignored data about how women make such decisions and what 
proportion of women pregnant with fetuses affected with cystic fibrosis 
would use testing for such purposes.63 
A more systematic approach for addressing genetic technologies would 
be to develop a central set of principles that apply to all such technologies 
and serve as a starting point in the development of regulatory policy. Any 
deviation from those principles would then have to be justified by sufficient 
evidence and analysis. But how can such principles be derived? A promising 
approach is to analyze the conceptual frameworks that govern the adoption of 
other medical technologies in the United States to determine which one is the 
 58. See, e.g., HEALTHY CHILDREN, supra note 43. Workshop on Population Screening for the 
Cystic Fibrosis Gene, Statement from the National Institutes of Health Workshop on Population 
Screening for the Cystic Fibrosis Gene, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 70 (1990). 
 59. See ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE, supra note 1, at 184-206. 
 60. Biotechnology and the European Public Concerted Action Group, Europe Ambivalent on 
Biotechnology, 371 NATURE 845, 845 (1997). 
 61. Id. at 947. The researchers note that this is in keeping with ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: 
TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (1992), and ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 
(1990). 
 62. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., CYSTIC FIBROSIS AND DNA TESTS: 
IMPLICATIONS OF CARRIER SCREENING 39-40 (1992) [hereinafter CYSTIC FIBROSIS AND DNA TESTS]. 
 63. In its cost-benefit analyses, the OTA Committee assumed in most of the scenarios that one 
hundred percent of women with affected fetuses would abort. Id. This assumption is inconsistent with 
studies of carrier/carrier couples in which only twenty percent of the couples said they would abort an 
affected fetus. Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Attitudes Toward Abortion Among Parents of Children with 
Cystic Fibrosis, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 992, 995 (1991). 
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most appropriate for genetics.  
The diagnosis and treatment of disease have long been the focus of social 
policy debates. Concerns about access to health care services and their cost, 
quality, and social impact have led to a variety of professional, institutional, 
and legal guidelines from medical licensing laws to drug safety regulations. 
Three different models dominate health care services regulations today: the 
medical model, the public health model, and the fundamental rights model. 
Determining the appropriate application of each model depends upon the 
perceived risks and benefits of the health care service at issue and the aspect 
of a person’s life the service addresses. Choosing the wrong public policy 
response to genetics could aggravate the negative impacts of genetic 
services.64 Moreover, the policies we develop are a crucial statement about 
“who we are and what we value.”65 
A. The Medical Model 
The medical model is the most common approach to setting policy for 
health care services in the United States. This model assumes that people will 
have access to particular health care services, as long as they can afford them 
and as long as health care providers are willing to offer them. Although this 
model emphasizes individual patient decisions, the physician is ultimately the 
gatekeeper for health care services and can be the driving force in 
recommending such services. Issues such as quality assurance and 
confidentiality are generally left to the standards of the medical profession. 
The underlying premise of the medical model is that physicians can judge 
which interventions a patient requires. In fact, for many generations, patients 
were expected to do whatever the doctor ordered. In 1957, a California court 
introduced for the first time the legal requirement of informed consent into 
the medical model. Under this doctrine, a physician must give patients 
sufficient information in advance of a proposed treatment to make a knowing 
decision about whether to undergo it.66 At least twenty-three states have 
adopted informed consent statutes requiring physicians to give patients 
certain information before a proposed treatment (and, in some instances, 
 64. “The imprimatur of public policy can foster beliefs that eventually prove to have little basis 
in fact,” observed geneticist Neil A. Holtzman. Interview with Neil A. Holtzman, MD, MPH, Johns 
Hopkins University Medical Institutions (Nov. 1, 1998). 
 65. Message from David Dingwall, Canadian Minister of Health, in NEW REPRODUCTIVE AND 
GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES: SETTING BOUNDARIES, ENHANCING HEALTH (1996) (“New genetic 
technologies concern the future of our society. How we manage them will be no less than a statement 
of who we are and what we value.”). 
 66. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. 1957). 
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before a diagnostic procedure as well), including the nature of the patient’s 
condition and the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed 
intervention.67 
The legal ideal of informed consent is rarely seen in practice, however.68 
A typical study found “that it was common in the hospitals studied for 
physicians to fail to inform patients about the nature, purpose, and risks of a 
planned procedure in a way that would enable them to make meaningful 
decisions.”69 In part, physicians’ lack of disclosure is due to a profound 
misunderstanding of what patients actually want to know.70 While only 
thirteen percent of physicians in one study said they would give “a straight 
statistical prognosis” to patients with advanced lung cancer, eighty-five 
percent of the public indicated that they wished to have that sort of 
information.71 A study on the communication between physicians and 
patients with cancer showed that seventy-five percent of elderly patients 
diagnosed with cancer felt that their doctors “created undue worry by not 
providing them with enough information.”72 Another study found that forty 
percent of cancer patients felt they “were not fully informed about their 
diagnosis, prognosis and treatment.”73 Moreover, in most states, the scope of 
the disclosure is determined by the medical profession itself. Physicians are 
only “required to disclose that information which other minimally competent 
physicians would disclose in like or similar circumstances.”74 In a minority 
of states, the standard is based on patient needs. Physicians in those states 
must disclose what a reasonable patient would want to know before making 
 67. See Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. 
LEGAL MED. 163 (1984). 
 68. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 1 (1984), points out that 
“disclosure and consent, except in the most rudimentary fashion, are obligations alien to medical 
thinking and practice.” 
 69. Charles Lidz & Alan Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical Care, in 2 
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT 
IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 399-405 (President’s Commission for the Study of the 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research ed., 1982). 
 70. In one survey, eighty-eight percent of physicians believed “patients want doctors to choose 
for them the best alternative.” In contrast, seventy-two percent of the public said they wanted the 
decisions to be made jointly. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP (President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
ed., 1982). 
 71. Id. at 75. 
 72. Behavioral Medicine, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 6, 1998, at 1F. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 55 
U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 343 (1994). 
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the decision.75 
Thus, under the medical model, informed consent receives little attention. 
This lack of attention is thought to be tolerable because people seek medical 
services when they already have a health problem, and because physicians 
are thought to be acting in the patient’s best interest by providing those 
services. For example, there is little protest when certain routine, noninvasive 
blood tests are undertaken without advance explanation.76 
Medical malpractice suits are the mechanism on which the medical model 
relies to address concerns about the quality of care. Patients may sue health 
care providers who fail to meet the “standard of care.”77 Unlike other areas of 
law where the standards of behavior are externally imposed, the medical 
profession itself sets the standard of care in medicine. A physician has a duty 
to follow the standards set by the majority of the profession (or, at least, a 
“respectable minority” of the profession).78 Even if the profession provides 
abysmal care for a particular disorder, a physician who meets that low 
standard is not liable for bad outcomes. Only on extremely rare occasions 
have courts held that the standards of a particular medical field were so low 
that a different standard should govern.79 
The medical malpractice system of quality assurance relies on a particular 
signaling method for error. It assumes that the patient is able to decide by his 
or her worsened condition that an error has occurred. When a physician fails 
to diagnose a cancer and the condition subsequently manifests, the patient is 
usually aware that an error has been made. When an improper medical or 
surgical treatment is undertaken, the patient may be aware of the error 
because of the resulting harm or because of the need for a corrective 
treatment. Of course, this approach is far from perfect. Patients whose 
conditions worsen may believe their declining state results from their 
underlying illness and not realize that it results from the physician’s 
 75. LORI ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A LEGAL FRONTIER 110 (1987) [hereinafter 
ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS]. The most famous decision using the reasonable patient standard is 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 76. When a patient’s blood is tested in a chemistry profile, a hospitals test for liver disease, 
kidney disease, and other diseases without explaining each test in detail. 
 77. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (3d ed. 
1997). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (holding that although it is the 
medical standard to only offer a glaucoma test to patients over the age of forty, “the reasonable 
standard that should have been followed [in this case, where the plaintiff was under the age of forty] 
was the timely giving of this . . . test”). This case is only one of a handful of such cases. Moreover, 
immediately after the case, the Washington legislature tried to avoid future cases by passing a statute, 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (West 2001), requiring that plaintiffs in malpractice actions prove 
that the physician had violated the medical standard of care. 
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negligence. 
Currently, the medical model regulates most genetic services. Under it, 
physicians are the source of information about genetic tests, although the fast 
pace of gene discovery may make it difficult for physicians to keep their 
knowledge current. If genetic tests or services are performed negligently, the 
only recourse for patients would be a malpractice suit. The harm, however, 
might not be discovered until years later, past the time within which patients 
are allowed to bring suit.80 An erroneous “normal” result on a genetic cancer 
test, for example, may not be discovered until after the person developed 
cancer decades later. Certain side effects of gene therapy on embryos—such 
as sterility—may not be possible to detect until the child reaches 
reproductive age. 
The medical model is most appropriate in a situation where physicians 
have a high level of knowledge about the health care service at issue, the 
service has a clear benefit to the patient, negligence is easily detectable, and 
use of the service does not have potential to harm the patient physically, 
psychologically, or socially in a way that might cause the patient to reject the 
service. Determining whether the medical model should apply requires an 
assessment of the capability of the medical system to deliver genetic services 
in a high quality way and the extent to which new genetic services such as 
testing to predict later-onset disorders require more attention to patient 
consent than do other medical services. 
B. The Public Health Model 
A less common approach for regulating health care services is known as 
the public health model.81 The public health model attempts to prevent 
disease through education, the financing of certain health care services, and, 
in some instances, mandating interventions such as vaccinations.82 Generally, 
public health measures are invoked to prevent imminent, substantial hazards 
to the population at large through efforts to eradicate infectious disease.83 
 80. Several cases have already held that the statute of limitations in situations involving genetics 
runs from the time of the negligent act, rather than from the time the patient learns that the test result 
was wrong. Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Weed v. Meyers, 674 
N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). This determination would preclude suit, for example, for a 
person who was told negligently that he or she did not have a gene mutation for Huntington’s disease 
and later developed the disease. 
 81. See, e.g., Patricia A. Baird & Charles R. Scriver, Genetics and the Public Health, in PUBLIC 
HEALTH & PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 983 (John M. Last & Robert B. Wallace eds., 13th ed. 1992). 
 82. See, e.g., Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product 
Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1853, 1860 (1995). 
 83. See generally Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The “Names Debate”: The Case 
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The classic mandate for public health came when health benefits could only 
be realized through intervention that required participation of the public as a 
whole. This dictate involved such efforts as the development of sewers, 
fluoridation of water, certain infectious disease screening programs (such as 
syphilis testing prior to marriage), and vaccination.84 
Mandatory intervention, such as vaccination, is used very rarely in health 
care. The laws that were adopted to require vaccinations, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision that upheld them,85 occurred at a time when 
infectious diseases such as smallpox and typhoid threatened to kill off whole 
towns. Smallpox had already killed sixty million people in eighteenth century 
Europe.86 The Court likened society’s ability to vaccinate people to its ability 
to draft citizens to defend itself in wartime.87 The principle behind the 
vaccination laws is one of reciprocity:88 mandatory vaccination of a 
particular individual protects other members of the community, while 
mandatory vaccination of others protects the individual. Historically, courts 
have not ordered nontherapeutic medical interventions for the benefit of an 
identifiable third party. For example, no cousin,89 father,90 or half-sibling91 
has been forced to provide bone marrow to a relative. Nor has a hospital been 
required to disclose the name of a potential bone-marrow donor to a patient 
dying of leukemia.92 
Another prime tenet of public health has been education. At the founding 
of the public health field, education focused mainly on information about the 
prevention of infectious disease. More recently, public health education has 
been focused on disease prevention through antismoking campaigns,93 proper 
nutrition messages,94 and information for pregnant women.95 These 
for National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 705-09 (1998). 
 84. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905) (“The state legislature proceeded upon 
the theory which recognized vaccination as at least an effective if not the best known way in which to 
meet and suppress the evils of a smallpox epidemic that imperiled an entire population.”). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Daniel F. Roses, From Hunter and the Great Pox to Jenner and Smallpox, 175 SURGERY 
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 365, 366 (1992). 
 87. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29. 
 88. Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 24-25 (1987). 
 89. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978). 
 90. In re George, 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. App. 1981). 
 91. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990). 
 92. Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983). 
 93. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of Infectious 
Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 79 (1999). 
 94. Id. at 80. 
 95. See generally Jennifer Sinton, Note, Rights Discourse and Mandatory HIV Testing of 
Pregnant Women and Newborns, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 187 (1997) (discussing issues surrounding mandatory 
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educational messages are directed to people who may not perceive 
themselves as ill and may not seek a physician who would otherwise provide 
the medical information. 
Currently, there is a move to apply the public health model to an 
increasing number of genetic services. Genetics is “the ultimate public health 
issue,”96 according to Muin Khoury, head of the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention’s new Office of Genetics. A range of policies are in place to 
address genetics within a public health model.97 These policies include a 
variety of efforts to enhance awareness of and to encourage the use of genetic 
technologies, such as a California regulation requiring obstetricians to offer 
maternal serum alpha-fetoprotein (MSAFP) testing to pregnant women in 
order to evaluate whether their fetuses have spina bifida or other neural tube 
defects.98 They also include efforts to make genetic services available to low-
income people, such as the public funding of amniocentesis under Medicaid 
programs in forty-five states.99 
States have also adopted and, in some cases, repealed laws that required 
people to use certain genetic services. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
statutes in more than twenty-five states required the sterilization of 
institutionalized people thought to have disfavored genetic traits.100 In the 
early 1970s, many states passed laws mandating the sickle cell anemia 
screening of African Americans.101 Both sets of these laws have now been 
repealed.102 Currently, state laws mandate the use of genetic services in only 
one instance: newborn genetic screening. In five states, laws mandate that 
blood samples be taken of newborns to be tested for genetic disorders such as 
phenylketonuria (PKU), a genetic disorder that can cause mental retardation 
if the infant is not treated soon after birth, and congenital hypothyroidism.103 
In forty other states, parents ostensibly have the right to refuse newborn 
HIV testing of pregnant women). 
 96. CDC Speaks Out on Gene Testing: Won’t Scan Healthy Popultion, MEDICAL UTILIZATION 
MANAGEMENT, May 28, 1998, available at NEXUS, Lexis Library, News Group file. 
 97. For a summary of some of these approaches, see Lori B. Andrews, Public Choices and 
Private Choices: Legal Regulation of Genetic Testing, in JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 
(Marc A. Lappé & Timothy F. Murphy eds., 1994). 
 98. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 6527 (2000). 
 99. CYSTIC FIBROSIS AND DNA TESTS, supra note 62, at 28. Currently, there is varied coverage 
of genetic testing and conselling by state Medicaid programs. For example, forty-five state Medicaid 
programs cover amniocentesis and twenty-six state Medicaid programs cover DNA analysis. Id. 
 100. PHILIP REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 94 (1991). 
 101. ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS, supra note 75, at 18. 
 102. Id. at 15, 18. 
 103. See id. at 238. 
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screening,104 but most of them are not told that they have such a right so 
testing is de facto mandatory. 
Under the public health model, the classic case for the use of the 
educational component occurs when there is widespread consensus that a 
particular lifestyle choice (e.g., smoking, unprotected sexual intercourse, lack 
of prenatal care) is dangerous and that making certain information available 
will help avert the danger by encouraging people to change their behavior. 
The mandatory intervention aspect of the public health model is most 
appropriately applied to prevent the transmission of serious diseases to large 
numbers of people. Determining whether genetics should be handled within 
the public health model requires assessments of the seriousness of a disorder, 
of whether prevention can adequately be achieved, and of whether 
prevention itself is an appropriate goal. While society might achieve near-
consensus about the appropriateness of vaccination to prevent measles, it is 
unlikely there would be support for mandatory prenatal diagnosis and 
abortion as a way to prevent particular genetic diseases. 
C. The Fundamental Rights Model 
A third approach, the fundamental rights model, is applied to health care 
services that are central to our notions of ourselves, such as reproductive 
services. The fundamental rights model attempts to ensure that a health care 
service takes place only voluntarily, with extensive information given in 
advance, and only when quality assurance mechanisms exist. In these 
situations, governmental restrictions on health care services require greater 
justification according to the courts. Decisions about reproduction can 
logically apply a fundamental rights approach because such decisions 
provide important ways of expressing ourselves and have a vast impact on 
our lives. The decision whether or not to have a child expresses an 
individual’s personal beliefs and has a significant impact on his or her 
lifestyle. Certain U.S. Supreme Court decisions, for example, recognize that 
a woman’s ability to employ contraception methods and to undergo an 
abortion allows her to pursue other important means of personal 
development, such as education and employment.105 Under the fundamental 
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Casey said: 
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments people have organized intimate 
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in 
reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The ability of 
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by 
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rights approach, use of a particular health care service (such as sterilization or 
abortion) must be voluntary and uncoerced.106 In addition, an individual is 
entitled to have access to necessary information before undergoing the 
service. Under a federal law, for example, in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics 
must disclose their success rates.107 In several states, lengthy disclosures 
must be made about the medical and psychological backgrounds of proposed 
surrogate mothers.108 
The fundamental rights model allows for enhanced regulation of quality 
assurance when the usual tort incentives to behave nonnegligently do not 
operate with enough force in a particular field. This is particularly true with 
respect to reproductive technologies where the harm from an error might not 
be discovered until the next generation.109 In addition, reproductive 
technologies do not have the same signaling system with regard to 
malpractice, as compared to other areas of medicine. When a patient is ill and 
undergoes surgery where negligence occurs, the patient’s condition can 
worsen. When a healthy couple experiences negligence in an in vitro 
fertilization process, however, their own physical health does not generally 
suffer. Because IVF has only about a twenty-eight percent success rate,110 the 
couple may not realize or be able to prove that negligence has occurred. They 
may think, or be led to believe, that they are just in the unlucky seventy-two 
percent. Consequently, some states have adopted statutes to regulate the 
qualifications of the personnel who perform IVF111 and to require that clinics 
disclose success rates.112 
their ability to control their reproductive lives. 
Id. at 856. 
 106. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-5 (1994); 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.203-.205, 441.250-.259 (1999). Family 
planning sterilizations performed with federally assisted funding are permissible only after obtaining 
noncoerced, voluntary, and informed consent from competent patients. Health care providers in 
federally assisted family planning projects are prohibited from performing sterilizations on individuals 
from whom they did not obtain informed consent. The federal guidelines include specific provisions 
that must be met when acquiring informed consent prior to the procedure. The federal requirements 
exist to ensure that people who undergo sterilization procedures do so voluntarily and knowingly. 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1(a) (1994). Virginia has a similar law. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 
(2000). 
 108. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2000). 
 109. For example, if a new fertilization technique leads to sterilization in offspring, it will not be 
discovered until the next generation. 
 110. Based on live births per retrieval for fresh, nondonor cycles IVF was 27.7% successful in 
1997. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
ET AL., 1997 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART) SUCCESS RATES, NATIONAL SUMMARY 
AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS fig. 8, at 17, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/art97/pdf/ 
ART97.pdf (Dec. 1999). 
 111. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:128 (2000). 
 112. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 (2000). 
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The fundamental rights approach has an additional role: protecting certain 
groups of patients from discrimination. The U.S. Constitution guarantees 
equal protection of laws;113 therefore, government-funded entities cannot 
discriminate against patients based on race, gender, religion, or ethnic 
status.114 Additional federal and state statutes provide further protection. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, prohibits employers, health 
care providers, and other groups from discriminating against patients based 
on their disability.115 Some state human rights statutes prohibit discrimination 
against people based on race, gender, and marital status.116 City ordinances, 
too, may provide additional protections, such as prohibition against 
discrimination based on sexual preference.117 In some instances, the 
fundamental rights approach also serves as a justification for requiring public 
funding for additional genetics services for people who cannot afford 
them.118 
The fundamental rights approach has been applied to certain genetics 
services, most often those involving reproduction. In Lifchez v. Hartigan, a 
federal court struck down a state statute banning embryo and fetal research 
because it prohibited couples from using experimental forms of prenatal 
testing (such as chorionic villi sampling, which was considered experimental 
at the time) to learn genetic information about the fetus.119 The court held 
that because people have a fundamental right to privacy when making 
reproductive decisions,120 they also have a fundamental right to certain 
information needed to make those decisions.121 Legislatures in six states have 
mirrored this fundamental rights policy by allowing experimental genetic 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). 
 115. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). 
 116. Under the Illinois Human Rights Act, for example, an employer may not discriminate 
unlawfully. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(a) (1998). 
 117. Under the City of Chicago Human Rights Ordinance, employers may not discriminate against 
employees or applicants based on race, color, sex, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, 
sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge status, or source of income. 
CHICAGO, IL, ORDINANCES, § 2-160-030 (1998). 
 118. Under the existing fundamental rights analysis with respect to abortion, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has taken the position that federal constitutional law does not require the public funding of 
abortion. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). However, some state legislatures 
have enacted laws funding abortion for poor women and some courts have held that the state 
constitution requires funding of abortion to enable women to exercise their fundamental right to 
privacy to make reproductive decisions. See, e.g., Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 
399-400 (Mass. 1981). 
 119. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 120. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376. 
 121. Id. at 1377. 
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screening of embryos.122 
The fundamental rights approach applies well to situations in which 
health care providers may lack necessary information or may be unduly 
influenced by their personal feelings. It is considered to be the most 
appropriate approach when the decision to use or to refuse a particular health 
care service has an impact on how the individual is viewed and treated by 
social institutions. The fundamental rights model is also used if traditional 
malpractice law is inadequate to assure quality. 
IV. USING EMPIRICAL DATA ABOUT THE IMPACT OF GENETIC SERVICES 
TO DEVELOP POLICY 
Genetic testing generates information unparalleled in scope compared to 
other areas of medicine. People can learn that, decades later, they will suffer 
from an untreatable disorder,123 that they have an increased risk of cancer,124 
or that their children have a one-in-four chance of dying of a serious disorder 
in childhood.125 The impact of this knowledge has a profound effect on 
people’s lives by challenging their self-image,126 by altering their cultural and 
social identity,127 and by changing their relationships with family and 
friends,128 and by causing them to think about their life, health, and 
responsibilities in new ways. 
Medical and social scientific studies provide data on the effects of genetic 
technologies, and these studies can be used to analyze the potential impact of 
adopting policies based on a particular conceptual framework. The studies 
show that learning about one’s genetic information can have a negative 
impact on one’s self-concept, can significantly change the way one 
experiences pregnancy, can change one’s personal relationships, and can lead 
to stigmatization and discrimination by others.129 
The dizzying assortment of available genetic services raises challenges 
for people as individuals and as members of a larger community. In the near 
future, every person will be faced with the question of whether he or she 
should undergo genetic testing. In some instances, people will even find—as 
 122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 2001); MICH. COMP. Laws §§ 333.2685-92 
(West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15(II) (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01(3) (2000); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(c) (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (2000). 
 123. For example, one may have advance knowledge of Huntington’s disease. 
 124. For example, genetic testing can reveal an increased risk of breast cancer. 
 125. For example, one may test for recessive genetic diseases. 
 126. See infra Part IV.A. 
 127. See infra Part IV.B. 
 128. See infra Part IV.C. 
 129. See infra notes 132-201 and accompanying text. 
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hundreds of people have already found—that they have been tested without 
their knowledge or consent.130 Third parties such as insurers, employers, and 
courts may be making decisions about a person based on his or her genes.131 
A. Self-Concept 
The information that is generated through the use of genetic technologies 
has an impact on a person’s emotional well-being and self-concept.132 An 
individual’s carrier status for a recessive disease will have no effect on his or 
her health, and although he or she may objectively understand that fact, 
carriers tend to have more negative feelings about their future health than the 
general population.133 In an eight-year follow-up study on individuals who 
had been screened for Tay-Sachs carrier status when in high school, forty-six 
percent recalled that they were upset at the time of their result,134 and 
approximately twenty percent remained worried six to eight years later.135 
Genetic information can affect people’s reproductive behavior, including 
their willingness to conceive a child,136 to continue a pregnancy,137 or to use 
alternative reproduction technologies, such as gamete or embryo donation or 
adoption to become a parent.138 It can change the way women experience 
both pregnancy and motherhood.139 The existence of prenatal diagnostic 
technologies also changes concepts about what type of children are “normal” 
and worthy of a mother’s unconditional love. A poll found that twelve 
 130. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 131. See supra Part V.D for a discussion of genetic discrimination. 
 132. See, e.g., Mark Lipkin, Jr. et al., Genetic Counseling of Asymptomatic Carriers in a Primary 
Care Setting, 105 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 115 (1986). There are also speculative philosophical 
writings about how genetic technologies might change self-concept. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, The 
Human Genome Project and Human Identity, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 7 (1992). 
 133. Theresa M. Marteau, Psychological Implications of Genetic Screening, in 28 BIRTH 
DEFECTS: ORIGINAL ARTICLE SERIES 185, 186-87 (1992). Although Tay-Sachs carriers viewed their 
current health status no differently than noncarriers, carriers’ perception of future health and risk of 
illness was significantly more negative than noncarriers. Id. 
 134. Susan Zeesman et al., A Private View of Hetrozygotes: Eight-Year Follow-Up Study on 
Carriers of the Tay-Sachs Gene Detected by High School Screening in Montreal, 18 AM. J. MED. 
GENETICS 769, 772 (1984). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Nancy Wexler, Clairvoyance and Caution: Repercussions from the Human Genome 
Project, in THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 
211-43 (Daniel J. Keveles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992). 
 137. See Mitchell S. Golbus et al., Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis in 3000 Amniocenteses,” 300 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 157 (1979). 
 138. See Michael K. McCormack et al., Attitudes Regarding Utilization of Artificial Insemination 
by Donor in Huntington’s Disease, 14 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 5-13 (1983). 
 
 139. See Barbara Katz Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy: Then and Now, 8 FETAL DIAGNOSIS & 
THERAPY 60 (1993); Tjeerd Tymstra, Prenatal Diagnosis, Prenatal Screening, and the Rise of the 
Tentative Pregnancy, 7 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTHCARE 509 (1991). 
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percent of Americans would consider aborting a fetus predisposed to severe 
untreatable obesity.140 
Presymptomatic genetic testing for late-onset disorders can be even more 
problematic because the results may signal future health risks for an 
individual. In a preliminary study of BRCA1 testing for a predisposition for 
breast cancer, a substantial number of women with the mutation experienced 
psychological distress.141 Learning that one has a BRCA1 or BRCA2 
mutation can create a schism between a woman and her body. After DNA 
testing revealed she had a BRCA1 mutation, one person said, “It felt as if 
there was a time bomb ticking away inside me.”142 
The psychological impact of learning that one has the gene for an 
untreatable disorder such as Huntington’s disease can be significant. 
Huntington’s disease is a dominant disorder where the children of at-risk 
individuals have a fifty percent chance of inheriting the disease.143 
Huntington’s disease is a genetically-linked illness, striking in middle age 
and progressively destroying the brain’s neurons.144 The disease retards one’s 
motor skills, slowly causes confusion, irritability, depression, dementia, and 
movement disorders, and eventually kills the individual.145 “uicide is now a 
question of when, not if,” a woman told her psychologist after learning that 
she had the genetic mutation associated with Huntington’s disease.146 The 
suicide rate is nearly four times higher among people with Huntington’s 
disease than among the general population of whites in the United States.147 
 140. Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Attitudes Toward Abortion Among Parents of Children with Cystic 
Fibrosis, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 992, fig. 2, at 994 (1991). 
 141. Robert T. Croyle et al., Psychological Responses to BRCA1 Mutation Testing: Preliminary 
Findings, 16 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 63, 69 (1997). 
 142. Jo Revill, Why I Had a Mastectomy Before Cancer Was Diagnosed, EVENING STANDARD, 
Dec. 1, 1993, at 12. Jenny Wilson had a preventive mastectomy after cancer struck her twin sister and 
six other close relatives. Similarly, after her mother, grandmother, and aunt got breast cancer, Cheryl 
Corin-Bonder said, “I looked in the mirror every day and I couldn’t stand my breasts. I felt they would 
kill me. I wanted to save my life, and I didn’t care what anyone thought.” Carol Ann Campbell, 
Cheating Cancer Fear Drives Some to Surgery Before Disease Hits, BERGEN REC., May 15, 1994, at 
A1. Dr. T.S. Ravikumar, codirector of the Comprehensive Breast Care Cancer Center in New 
Brunswick, estimates that several hundred American women have preventive mastectomies every year. 
Id. at A8. 
 143. Simeon Margolis, Diagnosing, Predicting Huntington’s Disease, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 19, 
1995, at 5E. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Peter Gorner, Out of the Shadow a New Genetic Test Can Foretell Agonizing Death: Would 
You Take It?, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1988, at C1. At any given time, about 25,000 Americans are 
suffering from Huntington’s disease, but 150,000 others live knowing that they have a fifty percent 
chance of having inherited the gene and may develop the disease. Id. 
 146. LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT GENETICS 34 
(2001) [hereinafter ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT]. 
 147. Lindsay A. Farrer, Suicide and Attempted Suicide in Huntington’s Disease: Implications for 
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Even when people are prepared for bad news as a result of testing, they may 
still be shocked by the reality of it. A woman who expected that she had a 
faulty Huntington’s disease gene nonetheless stated after she received the 
results, “I feel like someone has died. Part of me has died, the hopeful 
part.”148 The woman experienced depression that became increasingly 
problematic.149 
Even when the results of genetic testing reveal that a person does not have 
a genetic mutation, the results may cause psychological harm. Some people 
experience “survivor’s guilt” similar to that of soldiers whose buddies have 
died in war; they wonder why they have been spared when other family 
members have tragically inherited the gene.150 Of people who undergo 
genetic testing for Huntington’s disease and learn that they do not have the 
gene, ten percent experience severe psychological problems as a result.151 
Many people whose parents have Huntington’s disease assume that they 
have inherited the gene.152 They may live their lives as if they will die of the 
disease in their fifties. They may have chosen not to pursue a particular 
career or relationship because they believe they will get the disease. Learning 
they do not have the gene radically changes their self-image.153 One woman 
said, “If I’m not at risk—who am I?”154 
One man, with a fifty percent risk for Huntington’s disease, lived his life 
in preparation for an early death.155 He spent money, rather than saving it, 
and ran up huge loans and credit card bills.156 He did not commit to a long-
term relationship with a girlfriend because he did not want to get married and 
risk passing on the gene to a child.157 Then he was tested and learned he did 
not have the gene associated with Huntington’s disease.158 He was just a 
Preclinical Testing of Persons at Risk, 24 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 305, 308 (1986). 
 148. Maurice Bloch et al., Predictive Testing for Huntington’s Disease in Canada: The 
Experience of Those Receiving an Increased Risk, 42 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 499, 504 (1992). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Kimberly A. Quaid et al., Knowledge, Attitude and Decision to be Tested for 
Huntington’s Disease, 36 CLINICAL GENETICS 431 (1989); Nancy Wexler, Genetic Jeopardy and the 
New Clairvoyance, 6 PROGRESS IN MED. GENETICS 277, 298 (1985). 
 151. Marlene Huggins et al., Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease in Canada: Adverse 
Effects and Unexpected Results in Those Receiving a Decreased Risk, 42 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 508, 
508 (1992). 
 152. If one of their parents has the disorder, there is a fifty percent chance they will inherit the 
genetic mutation and get the disorder themselves. ALICE WEXLER, MAPPING FATE: A MEMOIR OF 
FAMILY, RISK, AND GENETIC RESEARCH (1996). 
 153. See Huggins et al., supra note 151, at 512. 
 154. Id. at 510. 
 155. Id. at 512. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 511-12. 
 158. Id. 
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normal, healthy man who might need to start thinking about a mortgage 
rather than “living hard, dying young, and leaving a beautiful corpse.”159 The 
test results precipitated a downward spiral, culminating in embezzlement 
from his company to pay his bills.160 
B. Cultural and Social Identity 
Genetic information influences the expectations of tested individuals and 
can also transform their cultural past. Nowhere is the latter more clear than in 
Iota, Louisiana, a place where, according to the New Orleans historical 
archives, no one of Jewish descent set foot in New Orleans until the late 
nineteenth century.161 In actuality, in 1720, a German Jew named Johann 
Adam Edelmeirer crossed the ocean and settled in Louisiana.162 In addition 
to his worldly goods, it is now assumed that he brought with him the genetic 
mutation for the devastating disorder known as Tay-Sachs disease,163 
common to three percent of Ashkenazi Jews.164 Once in Louisiana, 
Edelmeirer probably hid his Jewish origins because of a 1724 regulation 
requiring that all Jews leave the territory within three months upon penalty of 
confiscation of their persons and property.165 These facts might not have been 
unearthed were it not for the recent advent of genetic testing. Just a few years 
ago, Cajun Catholic and fundamentalist families who were descendants of 
Edelmeirer, learned that they carried the Tay-Sachs mutation, commonly 
considered a “Jewish” mutation.166 
The psychological and social upheaval caused by this kind of information 
can be enormous, yet these scenarios will continue to be repeated as tested 
individuals receive genetic information linked to an ethnic and racial 
background about which they were unaware.167 In addition to the 
psychological changes in self-image, there may be dramatic changes in social 
standing and even in personal finances. For example, a person who is 
socially considered a Native American, yet does not meet what researchers 
claim is the typical genetic profile of a Native American, may be deprived of 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. 
 161. Laurie Garrett, A Hidden Killer in Cajun Country, NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 1990, at 4. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See generally Benedict Carey, Chance of a Lifetime, 8 HEALTH 90 (1994). 
 167. Some researchers claim they have discovered genetic markers related to race. Gail Vines, 
Genes in Black and White, NEW SCIENTIST, July 8, 1995, at 34. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss1/3
p221 Andrews.doc  7/17/01   5:01 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR GENETIC POLICY 245 
 
 
 
 
 
certain land rights and educational scholarships.168 
In Orthodox Judaism, rabbis with the highest status are thought to be 
descendants of Aaron, the older brother of Moses, who was the first of the 
Cohanim, the Jewish priesthood that predated the rabbis.169 In Orthodox and 
some conservative congregations, these descendants are the only rabbis who 
can perform particular religious duties.170 Researchers have now found a 
genetic pattern on the Y chromosome that they believe is shared by the 
descendants of the Cohanim.171 Such a test could in the future be used to 
remove rabbis from the high priesthood if their DNA does not measure up. 
C. Relationships with Spouses and Potential Spouses 
Genetic information also affects relationships with spouses and potential 
spouses. For centuries, people have chosen mates based on their potential to 
produce healthy children. Genetic testing can directly and indirectly affect 
such choices. It can also have a profound impact on intimate relationships. 
Currently, in the Orthodox Jewish community of New York, where 
arranged marriages are still common, genetic information is increasingly 
being taken into consideration at the matchmaking stage. People who are of 
Ashkenazi Jewish descent have a one in twenty-five chance of having a Tay-
Sachs genetic mutation.172 If two such carriers marry, each child would have 
a one in four chance of having the devastating disease.173 A child with Tay-
Sachs appears normal at birth but later loses motor functions, suffers massive 
neurological deterioration and seizures, and is likely to die by age six.174 A 
program in New York known as Chevra Dor Yeshorim, which means 
“Association of an Upright Generation,”175 offers Tay-Sachs carrier 
screening to Orthodox Jewish adolescents. Before a marriage is arranged, the 
matchmaker calls the program with the identification numbers of the two 
individuals involved.176 If they both carry the gene for Tay-Sachs, the two 
individuals are not matched for marriage.177 One rabbi has proclaimed, “It is 
 168. Eric T. Juengst, The Perils of Genetic Genealogy, 10 CENTERVIEWS 1, 3-5 (1996); Arthur L. 
Caplan, Handle with Care: Race, Class, and Genetics, in JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, 
supra note 97, at 30. 
 169. Denise Grady, Who is Aaron’s Heir? Father Doesn’t Always Know Best, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 1997, at 4. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Beverly Merz, Matchmaking Scheme Involves Tay-Sachs Problem, 258 JAMA 2636 (1987). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 
 177. Id. 
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the obligation of every parent, without exception, to turn to Chevra Dor 
Yeshorim, and heed their advice, before finalizing a match for his or her 
child.”178 
Most people, however, do not consciously seek a partner based on his or 
her genetic pedigree. Nevertheless, such information is becoming 
increasingly available, thereby creating complicated interpersonal questions. 
If a person has a gene for colon cancer, should he or she be obligated to warn 
a potential spouse? What happens when the recipient who believed such 
information would not make a difference in the relationship finds that he or 
she is beginning to view the loved one differently? 
Men are more likely than women to say they would alter marriage plans if 
they learned that their potential spouse was the carrier of a recessive genetic 
disorder. Eight years after participating in Tay-Sachs testing,179 ninety-five 
percent of female carriers (compared to sixty-nine percent of male carriers) 
responded that they would not alter marriage plans upon discovering their 
partner or intended partner was also a carrier.180 Another study of Tay-Sachs 
testing found that twenty-five percent of carriers and six percent of carriers’ 
spouses felt that knowing their own or their spouse’s carrier status would 
have affected their marriage decision.181 
What people say they will do is not always what they actually do. A study 
of sickle cell anemia testing in Orchemenos, Greece, provided information 
on actual behavior.182 Although people who are carriers of the sickle cell 
gene are healthy themselves, if they procreate with another carrier, each of 
their children has a twenty-five percent chance of having sickle cell 
anemia.183 The health care providers in Greece thought that the testing they 
offered would decrease the number of affected children by causing people to 
make more “rational” reproductive decisions (i.e., if a carrier and a 
noncarrier have a child together, there is no chance that the child will be 
affected with the disorder).184 What actually happened, however, was that 
sickle cell carriers were stigmatized.185 As a result, the birth rate of affected 
children did not decrease because, in some instances, only a carrier would 
 178. Id. 
 179. Zeesman et al., supra note 134. 
 180. Id. at 773. 
 181. Barton Childs et al., Tay-Sachs Screening: Social and Psychological Impact, 28 AM. J. HUM. 
GENETICS 550-52 (1976). 
 182. See George Stamatoyannopoulos, Problems of Screening and Counseling in the 
Hemoglobinopathies, in BIRTH DEFECTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE 268 (Arno G. Motulsky & F.J.G. Ebling eds., 1974). 
 183. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 61. 
 184. Stamatoyannopoulos, supra note 182, at 268. 
 185. Id. at 273. 
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marry another carrier.186 Similarly, in a maple syrup urine disease testing 
program among the Bedouin tribe, male carriers married outside the tribe, 
and female carriers were stigmatized and considered to be unmarriageable.187 
Genetic knowledge of carrier status may significantly impact couples’ 
relationships. In the Orchemenos study, twenty percent of the parents of 
noncarriers and ten percent of the parents of carriers advise[d] their children 
to avoid marrying a carrier.188 Seven percent of noncarriers avoided marrying 
a carrier, and some terminated their engagement when they learned the 
potential spouse had the sickle cell gene.189 Of the sickle cell carriers in the 
study, twenty-five percent concealed their status from their potential 
spouse.190 Twenty percent of the carriers broke off their engagement when 
they learned their prospective spouse was also a carrier.191 Likewise, follow-
up on twenty-one couples who received Huntington’s disease testing 
revealed that six had divorced, with three couples specifically attributing the 
divorce to the testing.192 
Genetic knowledge can also strain a couple’s relationship short of 
terminating it. People who learned they were likely to suffer from 
Huntington’s disease experienced a significant decline in their level of 
satisfaction with their primary relationship during the two-year follow-up 
period after receiving the test results.193 If a person is found to have a genetic 
mutation associated with a serious genetic disease, his or her partner will 
 186. Id. at 274. 
 187. Mairi Levitt, A Sociological Perspective on Genetic Screening, in THE ETHICS OF GENETIC 
SCREENING 157 (Ruth Chadwick et al. eds., 1999). 
 188. Id. at 274. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. L.B. Jakobsen et al., Psychological Consequences of Presymptomatic Genetic Testing,” 119 
TIDSSKR NOR LAEGEFOREN 1913, 1913-16 (1999). 
 
 193. A Canadian study assessed changes in relationships for individuals participating in predictive 
testing for Huntington’s disease by administering questionnaires before they received their test results 
and then again seven to ten days, and six, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months thereafter. The 
study included 217 individuals, “53 individuals received an increased risk . . . , 96 individuals received 
a decreased risk . . . , 33 individuals . . . [received] an uninformative result . . . ,” and 35 individuals 
ultimately decided not to participate in testing. T. Copley et al., Significant Changes in Social 
Relations After Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease, 55 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS ser. 1707, at 
A291 (1994). There were no differences between groups as far as gender, employment status, marital 
status, or number of children. However, the mean age of the decreased risk group was significantly 
older than the mean age of the other groups. Id. A U.S. study of individuals participating in predictive 
testing for Huntington’s disease found similar results. Nineteen couples participated in testing. Five of 
the couples received increased risk results. “The analysis of follow-up data indicates that high-risk 
individuals and couples are significantly more distressed [even up to] 12 months after testing than low-
risk individuals and couples.” Kimberly A. Quaid & Melissa K. Wesson, The Effects for Predictive 
Testing for Huntington Disease on Intimate Relationships, 55 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS ser. 1728, at 
A294 (1994). 
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naturally worry about the children they have created together. Partners of 
individuals with Huntington’s disease can develop resentment and hostility 
over the fact that the disease may have been transmitted unknowingly to their 
children.194 
Even when neither spouse has a mutated gene, the genetic testing can still 
impact the couple’s relationship. For example, one woman was disappointed 
when she was tested for Huntington’s disease and learned she did not have 
the mutation.195 She thought that if she learned she had the gene and would 
die soon, she would have had the courage to leave her husband.196 In another 
case, a man suffered from clinical depression when his wife learned she did 
not have the Huntington’s disease mutation.197 He had arranged his life and 
his retirement in such a way that he could care for her when she fell ill.198 He 
was a workaholic before he retired and planned a “second career” as his 
wife’s caretaker.199 When they discovered that she did not have the mutation, 
he felt as if he had lost his job and his purpose.200 
When a person encounters a problem in life, he or she often turns to a 
partner for comfort. In the case of genetic testing, however, the partner might 
be having a troubling reaction, different from that which the tested individual 
is experiencing. While married individuals are typically more emotionally 
well-adjusted than unmarried people, research on Huntington’s disease 
testing found that married persons who tested positive for the disease were 
less well-adjusted than unmarried persons who tested positive for the disease. 
Johns Hopkins researchers note that “[u]nlike single persons, married 
positives have the added psychological stress of knowing that they are 
‘causing’ distress in someone close to them.” Alternatively, positives may 
have been affected by their spouses’ reaction to the news.201 
The use of genetic services can cause a person to lose his or her internal 
moorings and to view himself or herself in a different way. It can also make 
conditional some of the previous unconditionals in relationships, creating 
fault lines in the very foundation of one’s life. 
 194. See Mary B. Hans & Arnulf H. Koeppen, Huntington’s Chorea: Its Impact on the Spouse, 
168 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 209 (1980). 
 195. Huggins et al., supra note 151, at 511. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 513. 
 198. Id. at 513-14. 
 199. Id. at 514. 
 200. Id. at 513-14. 
 201. Id. 
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V. USE OF GENETIC SERVICES 
Depending on their personalities, backgrounds, and life experiences, 
individuals may react in a variety of ways to the offer of genetic testing and 
the information generated by a test. Geneticists may fail to appreciate the 
complex factors that influence a person’s response to genetic services and 
merely assume that people will invariably find it beneficial to learn genetic 
information whether it brings good news or bad. Such an assumption is 
illustrated by the predictions that genetic services will become a part of 
normal health care. For example, cystic fibrosis (CF), a disorder of the 
exocrine glands that causes chronic obstructive lung disease, is “the most 
common potentially fatal genetic disease in the white population.”202 
Asymptomatic carriers of this recessive disorder have one gene with a CF 
mutation.203 If two carriers produce a child together, the child has a twenty-
five percent chance of being affected by cystic fibrosis.204 No known cure 
exists, and the average life expectancy is currently thirty years.205 
Nevertheless, some individuals lead normal lives without even realizing they 
have two genes with the mutation.206 
When scientists first discovered the cystic fibrosis gene, they assumed 
that virtually all whites of reproductive age would rush to be tested. Some 
analysts suggested that once testing became widely available, each genetics 
health care provider in the United States would spend at least sixteen weeks 
per year counseling individuals about cystic fibrosis testing.207 In an initial 
survey, eighty-four percent of patients in obstetrics and gynecology clinics 
indicated their “interest in being tested for CF carrier status before 
pregnancy.”208 When CF testing was offered free of charge in a series of pilot 
studies to the general population, however, less than one percent of the 
people offered the test actually took it.209 In another study, less than four 
percent of people responded to a free offer of cystic fibrosis carrier testing 
 202. HEALTHY CHILDREN, supra note 46, at 263. 
 203. Jean L. Marx, The Cystic Fibrosis Gene Is Found, 245 SCIENCE 923 (1989). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Melissa A. Rosenfeld & Francis S. Collins, Gene Therapy for Cystic Fibrosis, 109 
CHEST 241 (1996). 
 206. Suzanne P. Tomlinson, Policy Commentary: Genetic Testing for Cystic Fibrosis: A Personal 
Perspective, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 551, 559 (1998). 
 207. Benjamin S. Wilfond & Norman Fost, The Introduction of Cystic Fibrosis Carrier Screening 
into Clinical Practice: Policy Considerations, 70 MILBANK Q. 629, 639-40 (1992). 
 208. Jeffrey R. Botkin & Sonia Alemagno, Carrier Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: A Pilot Study of 
the Attitudes of Pregnant Women, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 723, 724 (1992). 
 209. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Lack of Interest by Nonpregnant Couples in Population-Based 
Cystic Fibrosis Carrier Screening, 58 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 617-627 (1996). 
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mailed from their HMOs.210 Even when they were approached for free CF 
carrier status screening at their doctor’s office, only approximately twenty-
four percent underwent testing.211 
Geneticists also expected widespread interest with respect to testing for 
late-onset disorders. When they identified a genetic marker for Huntington’s 
disease in 1983,212 and when they localized the gene itself in 1993,213 
scientists assumed that at-risk individuals would flock to be tested. 
Geneticists predicted a benefit to individuals who received Huntington’s 
disease testing,214 believing that those who tested negative for the genetic 
mutation associated with Huntington’s disease would be overjoyed at the 
results. They also assumed that people who tested positive for the gene 
associated with Huntington’s disease would, at some level, value the 
information because it would allow them to make financial provisions for 
their future illness, such as purchasing insurance, or to make lifestyle 
changes, such as not having children. 
The initial surveys of at-risk individuals seemed to support the 
geneticists’ beliefs. The majority of at-risk individuals said they would 
undergo Huntington’s disease testing if a test were available.215 When the test 
actually became available, however, fewer than fifteen percent of at-risk 
individuals chose to undergo the testing.216 Similarly, many people with 
relatives affected with breast cancer said that they would undergo genetic 
testing if it were available.217 Once they learned more about the uncertainties 
and risks in testing, however, fewer women than expected pursued such 
 210. Ellen S. Tambor et al., Offering Cystic Fibrosis Carrier Screening to an HMO Population: 
Factors Associated with Utilization, 6 AM J. HUM. GENETICS 626-637 (1994). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See James F. Gusella et al., A Polymorphic DNA Marker Genetically Linked to Huntington’s 
Disease, 306 NATURE 234 (1983). 
 213. See The Huntington’s Disease Collaborative Research Group, A Novel Gene Containing a 
Trinucleotide Repeat that is Expanded and Unstable in Huntington’s Disease Chromosomes, 72 CELL 
971 (1993). 
 214. Some researchers assumed that Huntington’s Disease testing would be beneficial because 
testing would resolve the uncertainty, no matter what the result. But in some cases, “uncertainty can 
also reduce distress.” Baum et al., supra note 31, at 12. 
 215. Seymour Kessler, Psychiatric Implications of Presymptomatic Testing for Huntington’s 
Disease, 7 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 212, 212-13 (1987). 
 216. David Craufurd et al., Uptake of Presymptomatic Predictive Testing for Huntington’s 
Disease, 2 LANCET 603, 604 (1989). See also Maurice Bloch et al., Predictive Testing for 
Huntington’s Disease: II. Demographic Characteristics, Life-Style Patterns, Attitudes, and 
Psychosocial Assessments of the First Fifty-One Test Candidates, 32 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 217, 222 
(1989).  
 217. See Robert T. Croyle & Caryn Lerman, Interest in Genetic Testing for Colon Cancer 
Susceptibility: Cognitive and Emotional Correlates, 22 PREVENTIVE MED. 284 (1993). 
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testing.218 
The low testing rate is one indication of the complexities of the decision 
to use genetic technologies. The ambivalent reactions that people have to 
their test results further indicate that genetic technologies are not an 
unalloyed benefit. Though scientists assume that if the public is educated 
about new genetic technologies, they will be more supportive of them, this is 
often not the case. The more that people know about basic biology, the less 
optimistic they are about the potential benefits of biotechnology and genetic 
engineering.219 The more that women know about the limited predictive 
value of breast cancer testing, the less likely it is that they will take the test.220 
A. The Impact of Genetic Testing on Preventive Activities 
Genetic testing is often thought to be beneficial even for people who test 
positive as a way to motivate them to undertake health surveillance or 
prevention activities. People may even think that the information will help 
them cope when the disease manifests. Various studies, however, have found 
that these benefits do not necessarily occur after genetic testing.221 In fact, 
evidence exists that the stress created by genetic information can actually 
lessen the likelihood that the individual will engage in surveillance strategies 
and will monitor himself or herself for early signs of the disease.222 Even if 
the person does engage in preventive strategies, the physiological and 
psychological harm from increased stress may offset any benefit that comes 
from increased surveillance.223 
In addition, knowing one’s risk of disease prior to onset does not 
necessarily help the individual to cope with the disease once it manifests. A 
study found that carriers who coped with the initial results of Huntington’s 
disease testing became depressed or suicidal and showed disturbed 
 218. See Gail Geller et al., Informed Consent and BRCA1 Testing, 11 NATURE GENETICS 364, 364 
(1995). 
 219. Biotechnology and the European Public Concerted Action Group, Europe Ambivalent on 
Biotechnology, 387 NATURE 845, 845 (1997). 
 220. See Geller et al., supra note 218. 
 221. See, e.g., Andrew Baum et al., Stress and Genetic Testing for Disease Risk, 16 HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. 8, 10 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 222. Id. at 17. The authors note that a study of 140 women with family histories of breast cancer 
“found that breast cancer worries were associated with poorer adherence with mammography 
screening.” Id. at 16 (citing Caryn Lerman et al., Factors Associated with Repeat Adherence to Breast 
Cancer Screening, 19 PREVENTIVE MED. 279 (1990)). Another study found that the women at highest 
risk of breast cancer performed fewer self-examinations and those with close relatives diagnosed with 
breast cancer were less likely to undergo mammograms. Caryn Lerman et al., Psychological Side 
Effects of Breast Cancer Screening, 10 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 259 (1991). 
 223. Baum et al., supra note 221, at 109-11. 
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functioning once the symptoms manifested.224 
Moreover, when a treatment such as prophylactic surgery based on 
presymptomatic testing is offered to a presymptomatic individual, the 
treatment carries physical and psychological risks. As the first woman with 
the BRCA1 breast cancer gene mutation who underwent a prophylactic 
mastectomy said, “I had wonderful counselling beforehand but nothing 
prepared me for the feeling of loss [and] of mutilation. A woman’s breasts 
are very much tied up with the image she has of herself and however perfect 
the reconstruction you are aware they are not your own. It was far more 
emotionally traumatic than I had expected.”225 
B. Quality Assurance Problems in Genetics Services 
For most medical services, individuals rely on their physicians for advice, 
and society relies on the scientific community for their assessments of the 
risks and benefits of those services. This paradigm does not necessarily work 
well for genetic services, however. The commercial push to introduce tests 
has led to premature testing.226 In addition, since genetic services in the 
reproductive context may involve the termination of affected fetuses, 
physicians’ personal moral views may color their supposedly neutral medical 
advice.227 
Relying on physicians to disseminate new genetic information presents 
problems. Not all medical schools offer courses in genetics. A 1995 survey 
found that only sixty-eight percent of 125 American medical schools 
required students to take a genetics course.228 In some of those schools, the 
“course” was only four hours long.229 An interdisciplinary federal advisory 
task force observed that “genetics is not being taught adequately to all 
medical students” and urged that the schools’ “clinical departments pay 
greater attention to genetic issues.”230 
Researchers discover many new genes each month and move the genes 
rapidly into use in clinical diagnosis by physicians who are not adequately 
prepared to advise patients about the appropriate use and interpretation of 
 224. Aad Tibben et al., Presymptomatic DNA Testing for Huntington Disease: Identifying the 
Need for Psychological Intervention, 48 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 137, 140 (1993). 
 225. Revill, supra note 142. 
 226. Healy, supra note 22. 
 227. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT, supra note 146, at 123-24. 
 228. PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: FINAL REPORT 
OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING 65 (Neil A. Holtzman & Michael S. Watson eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING]. 
 229. Id. at 65. 
 230. Id. 
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their test results. In an assessment of the genetics knowledge of nearly two 
thousand primary care physicians, the average respondent had only a 
seventy-four percent correct response rate.231 In another study, residents in 
obstetrics and gynecology departments received a mean score of sixty-nine 
percent on a genetic examination.232 In addition, a study showed that one-
third of physicians surveyed erroneously interpreted the results of genetic 
testing for colorectal cancer.233 
Some of the current problems of inadequate genetic education by 
physicians may be alleviated by referring patients to genetic counselors234 
who are knowledgeable about the etiology of genetic disorders and the risks 
and benefits of testing. However, there are only approximately two thousand 
genetic counselors in the United States,235 most of whom are 
disproportionately located in certain geographic areas (i.e., New England, 
Chicago, and California).236 Even where counselors are available, physicians 
vary in their willingness to refer patients to genetic counselors. More 
pediatricians and obstetricians-gynecologists than primary care physicians, 
internists, and psychiatrists offer some form of genetic counseling.237 
Even if physicians are knowledgeable about genetics, they may 
disseminate inaccurate information to patients because the tests themselves 
are faulty, because laboratories run them incorrectly, or because the results 
are difficult to interpret. A 1999 study of 245 molecular genetic testing labs 
found that thirty-six labs (fifteen percent) scored lower than seventy percent 
on a quality-control scale.238 The researchers conducting the study 
highlighted the need for improved personnel qualifications and laboratory 
practice standards.239 
 231. Karen J. Hofman et al., Physicians’ Knowledge of Genetics and Genetic Tests, 68 ACAD. 
MED. 625 (1993). 
 232. M.A. Kershner et al., Knowledge of Genetics Among Residents in Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS A16 (1992). 
 233. Francis M. Giardiello et al., The Use and Interpretation of Commercial APC Gene Testing 
for Familial Adenomatous Polyposis, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 823, 824-25 (1997). 
 234. “Genetic counseling is the process by which individuals and families come to learn and 
understand relevant aspects of genetics; it is also the process for obtaining assistance in clarifying 
options available for their decision making and coping with the significance of personal and family 
genetic knowledge in their lives.” ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 148. 
 235. Katherine A. Schneider & Kathy J. Kalkbrenner, Career Information, at 
http://www.nsgc.org/pss98.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2001). 
 236. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 203. 
 237. Neil A. Holtzman, Primary Care Physicians as Providers of Frontline Genetic Services, 8 
FETAL DIAGNOSTIC THERAPY 213, 216-18 (1993). 
 238. Judy Peres, Genetic Testing Can Save Lives—But Errors Leave Scars, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 
1999, at C1, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. See also Margaret M. McGovern et 
al., Quality Assurance in Molecular Genetic Testing Laboratories, 281 JAMA 835 (1999). 
 239. McGovern et al., supra 238, at 127. 
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Moreover, it is more difficult to maintain the quality of genetic tests than 
many other medical tests.240 A genetic test for a late-onset disease that is 
performed negligently may not be discovered for however many years it 
takes the disease to manifest. Because most genetic testing results are 
negative outside of high-risk families, laboratory personnel may be less than 
vigilant.241 Tests may be performed in specialized laboratories far from 
where the sample is collected, thereby increasing the risk of mix-ups between 
samples.242 Because the DNA test may not predict all disease-causing 
mutations, false-negative testing results may arise.243 The meaning of the test 
may depend on an analysis of test results in other family members.244 The 
test may produce probabilistic data which most physicians are not adept at 
interpreting.245 Because certain diseases such as inherited breast cancer are 
incompletely penetrant, a positive test result may not necessarily mean the 
individual will get the disease.246 
Although errors have occurred in newborn screening,247 in karyotyping,248 
in interpretation of linkage studies,249 in predictive cancer testing,250 and in 
Tay-Sachs screening,251 only a small minority of states have special licensing 
requirements for laboratories undertaking genetic tests.252 These 
requirements vary widely. New York has a rigorous program for quality 
assurance,253 while Maryland merely requires that genetic laboratories 
perform satisfactorily in external proficiency testing programs approved by 
the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene.254 
Unfortunately, some state statutes impede, rather than encourage, quality 
in genetic services by prohibiting traditional malpractice suits for certain 
 240. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 127. 
 241. Id. at 117. 
 242. Id. at 133. 
 243. Id. at 117. 
 244. Id. at 127. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See id. at 130. 
 247. See Candy Holtzman et al., A Descriptive Epidemiology of Missed Cases of Phenylketonuria 
and Congenital Hypothyrodism, 78 PEDIATRICS 553 (1986). There are more than five percent false 
negatives in newborn screening. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 133 (citations omitted). 
 248. See Jerry Vockley et al., “Pseudomosaicism” for 4p—in Amniotic Fluid Cell Culture Proven 
to be True Mosaicism After Birth, 39 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 81 (1991). See also Martinez v. Long 
Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987). 
 249. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 123. 
 250. Francis M. Giardiello et al., supra note 233. See also Susan Gilbert, Doctors Often Misread 
Results of Genetic Tests, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1997, at C8. 
 251. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
 252. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 118. 
 253. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 57 (McKinney 2000). 
 254. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-211 (2000). 
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genetic services. Seven states have passed statutes prohibiting couples from 
suing their physicians or laboratories for negligent prenatal genetic testing if 
they claim that they would have aborted the fetus if the test had been 
properly performed.255 
Federal statutes address the quality of genetic services, but they are often 
not followed. Under the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976256 and the 
Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990,257 the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has the authority to scrutinize the components of genetic testing kits 
that are marketed in interstate commerce.258 Before such kits can be sold, the 
FDA requires proof of safety and efficacy in a premarket approval process.259 
However, the Assessing Genetic Risks Committee of the Institute of 
Medicine notes that “[o]nly a small proportion of genetic tests in widespread 
use have been reviewed by FDA; these include tests for hypothyroidism, . . . 
(PKU), and [maternal serum alphafetoprotein] MSAFP.”260 
Why have so few tests been reviewed by the FDA? The academic, 
government, hospital, and commercial laboratories are not marketing tests 
but, are instead, using their own components, known in the trade as “home 
brews.”261 The FDA has not aggressively regulated “home brews” even 
though they are used in tests sold to patients who use the results to make 
crucial decisions. In fact, the FDA has admitted that it does not exercise its 
authority to regulate these “home brew” genetic testing services.262 
Moreover, a 1995 survey found that an alarming number of organizations 
developing or offering “home brew” genetic tests have never contacted the 
FDA regarding such services. Of the forty-three biotech companies and 215 
not-for-profit organizations surveyed less than sixteen percent had contacted 
the FDA.263  
Even when the FDA has assessed a particular genetic test in its premarket 
approval process, problems may arise in assuring the quality of the test when 
it is used for other purposes. Maternal serum alphafetoprotein (MSAFP) 
 255. Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
2017, 2019 (1987). These statutes were the result of lobbying efforts of right to life groups. See 
Jennifer Mee, Note, Wrongful Conception: The Emergence of a Full Recovery Rule, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 
887, 896-97 (1992). 
 256. P.L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-k, 379, 379a (1994); 
42 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994)). 
 257. P.L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 360l, 383 (1994)). 
 258. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360s,l (1994). 
 259. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1994). 
 260. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 128. 
 261. Id. at 132. 
 262. Id. 
 263. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 228, at 30. 
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testing was scrutinized for its ability to predict the likelihood of neural tube 
defects in a fetus.264 Subsequently, the test has also been used to predict 
whether a fetus has Down syndrome, even though the test has neither been 
specifically approved nor assessed by the FDA for that purpose.265 
The genetics industry itself has expressed widespread concern about the 
poor quality of genetic services. In one survey, sixty-seven percent of the 
eighty-one biotechnology companies and seventy-five percent of the 245 
nonprofit organizations polled agreed that “FDA policies, or lack of policies, 
hinder the development of safe and effective genetic test kits or other 
products.”266 The vast majority (over eighty-four percent) of both types of 
organizations indicated that there were genetic testing laboratories that lacked 
adequate quality assurance programs.267 
The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967 (CLIA) could 
potentially improve the quality of genetic tests.268 This statute, which was 
tightened considerably in response to widespread errors in Pap smear tests, 
covers the hundreds of thousands of laboratories in the United States that 
provide tests “for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease . . . or 
the assessment of the health of, human beings.”269 Therefore, CLIA applies 
only to labs that provide to patients or doctors information upon which a 
health care decision will be made.270 It excludes research labs that do not 
provide identified test results to patients or doctors.271 CLIA requires labs to 
participate in proficiency testing programs in which blood and other samples 
are sent to the labs to determine if the labs can get accurate results.272 CLIA 
also requires lab inspections.273 
The problem with CLIA is that labs have to identify themselves for CLIA 
certification.274 Few genetic labs have applied for certification.275 Many 
researchers at university genetics laboratories that provide test results to 
patients and doctors fail even to realize they are covered by this law.276 
Moreover, “in many large academic hospitals, the central lab is not even 
 264. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 79. 
 265. Id. at 129. 
 266. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 228, tbl. 7, at 124. 
 267. Id. 
 268. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 124. 
 269. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (1994). See also ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 124-25. 
 270. See 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (1994). See also ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 126. 
 271. See supra note 270. 
 272. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(1)(D),(3) (1994). See also ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 
125. 
 273. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(g)(1) (1994). 
 274. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 126. 
 275. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 228, at 126. 
 
 276. Id. 
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aware of all the labs [in its own institution] that provide services.”277 
In its overall inspection program, the federal government found that 
eighty to eighty-four percent of the physician office labs inspected had 
problems under CLIA, and eleven percent had serious problems.278 
Additionally, CLIA lacks any special requirement for laboratories offering 
DNA-based genetic testing, so a lab need only demonstrate general, good 
laboratory practices.279 Because genetic testing is more complex than much 
of the other testing offered, there is reason for concern about the quality of 
information patients receive from genetic testing.280 For example, a 1995 
survey found that “commercial laboratory directors . . . were aware of poor 
quality laboratories who were offering services.”281 Because of the lack of 
reliable information available on the quality of standards in labs performing 
genetic tests, patients and providers may never know the identities of the 
poor quality labs. In fact, even the commercial laboratory directors 
themselves indicated that “information on the quality of laboratories spreads 
by word of mouth.”282 
C. Impact of Genetics on Cultural Values and Social Institutions 
Genetic information has the potential to change the nature of our social 
fabric by influencing our ideas about individual and social responsibility and 
by challenging basic societal concepts such as free will and equality. If most 
people choose to have prenatal diagnosis and to abort fetuses with certain 
disabilities, society may be less willing to provide services to people with 
those types of disabilities by viewing them as having erroneously slipped 
through the net of prenatal screening. Some physicians and lawyers are 
already claiming that people should have a duty to learn their genetic status 
and to make lifestyle choices about where to live, what type of job to take, 
what type of insurance to purchase, and even whether to bear a child based 
on that information. A medical article urged parents whose children have a 
genetic propensity toward skin cancer to quit their jobs and move to a rainy 
city like Seattle.283 The journal Food Technology predicted that, in the future, 
 277. Id. 
 278. HCFA to Complete First Round of POL Inspections by May 1995, BNA HEALTH CARE 
DAILY, Oct. 7, 1994. 
 279. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 228, at 115. On May 4, 
2000, the Department of Health and Human Services proposed new rules that would create a CLIA 
specialty dealing with genetics. 65 Fed. Reg. 25,928-934 (proposed May 4, 2000). 
 280. See ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT, supra note 146, at 114. 
 281. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 228, at 115. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Frederick Hecht & Barbara Kaiser McCaw, Chromosome Instability Syndromes, in 
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kitchen computers will generate diets individualized to people’s genetic 
profiles.284 In addition, some physicians and lawyers claim that it should be a 
crime to give birth to a child with a serious genetic disorder that could have 
been discovered prenatally.285 
Certain groups utilize genetics rationales in lobbying for social policies. 
Recently, an organization seeking school tax reductions argued against 
special education programs on the grounds that, because such disabilities are 
genetic, “responsibility should fall to the medical system, not to the 
schools.”286 Philanthropic organizations are also beginning to make 
predictions based on genetics. An article in a philanthropy journal, relying on 
the controversial book The Bell Curve, argued that because some people are 
genetically predestined to be low achievers, it is probably not worth spending 
foundation money to try to enhance their opportunities.287 
D. Stigmatization and Discrimination 
Genetic information influences people’s relationships with third parties, 
such as insurers and employers.288 While individuals might want to know 
their own genetic makeup in order to make important life decisions, such 
information can also be used against them. 
Among people in families with a known genetic condition, thirty-one 
percent have been denied health insurance coverage for some service or 
treatment because of their genetic status, whether or not they were actually 
GENETICS OF HUMAN CANCER 105, 114 (John J. Mulvihill et al. eds., 1977). 
 284. Fergus Clydesdale, Present and Future of Food Science and Technology in Industrialized 
Countries, FOOD TECH., Sept. 1989, at 134, cited in Dorothy Nelkin, The Social Dynamics of Genetic 
Testing: The Case of Fragile-X, 10 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 537, 546 (1996). 
 285. See, e.g., Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 
63, 111 (1984). 
 286. Dorothy Nelkin, Behavioral Genetics and Dismantling the Welfare State, in BEHAVIORAL 
GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND BIOLOGY 156, 165 (Ronald A. Carson & Mark A. Rothstein 
eds., 1999). 
 287. Criticizing such an approach, geneticist Benno Müller-Hill points out:  
The scientific prediction of a person’s limitations, and thus his possible fate, has a very dangerous 
component in that it may lead the individual to inaction and despair. It may also lead the 
population at large to believe that, as there is no real chance, money should not be wasted to 
counteract genetic limitations. It could be forgotten that these limitations are also set by 
environmental factors. 
Benno Müller-Hill, The Shadow of Genetic Injustice, 362 NATURE 491, 492 (1993).  
 288. For more information about how insurers have responded to information about people’s 
genetic status, see CYSTIC FIBROSIS AND DNA TESTS, supra note 62; Paul R. Billings et al., 
Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476 (1992). See also 
Neil A. Holtzman, PROCEED WITH CAUTION: PREDICTING GENETIC RISKS IN THE RECUMBINANT DNA 
ERA 195 (1989); Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and 
Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 119 (1991). 
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sick.289 When Kim Roembach-Ratliff learned through prenatal testing that 
her child had spina bifida, her insurer refused to provide coverage, claiming 
that the disease should be treated as a preexisting condition. “If we had found 
out in the delivery room that he had it, he would have been covered,” she 
said. “This genetic information was used against us.”290 Similarly, when a 
pregnant woman underwent cystic fibrosis testing and her fetus was 
diagnosed as being affected, her health maintenance organization informed 
her that it would not pay for the health care costs of the child if she chose not 
to abort. In that case, however, the decision was reversed after a public 
outcry.291 
A health insurance company told a woman whose mother had breast 
cancer that she could obtain health care coverage, but not for any treatment 
of breast cancer.292 In another case, a newborn diagnosed with PKU was 
covered under her father’s health insurance at the time, but when he changed 
jobs eight years later, he was told that his child was ineligible for coverage 
under his new group plan because of her diagnosis, even though her 
treatment had been completely successful and she was developmentally 
normal and healthy.293  
Some people have lost their health insurance as a result of their 
participation in genetics research, including a man who underwent screening 
for adenomatous polyposis colon cancer as part of a research study.294 
Because health insurance companies can exclude people with preexisting 
disorders, genetic testing provides an enormous loophole whereby numerous 
diseases can be classified as preexisting because they have their roots in a 
person’s genes.295 Whether or not a person wishes to risk insurance 
discrimination determines whether or not they will seek genetic information. 
Among high-risk individuals offered colon cancer testing, seventy-two 
percent of those with insurance decided to receive their results, while forty-
three percent of uninsured individuals decided not to.296 
 289. E. Virginia Lapham et al., Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives of Consumers, 274 SCI. 621, 
622 (1996). In another study, fourteen percent of genetic counselors surveyed reported that their 
counselees had difficulty obtaining or retaining health insurance due to genetic testing results. 
ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 270. 
 290. Stephanie Armour, Could Your Genes Hold You Back?, USA TODAY, May 5, 1999, at 1B. 
 291. See CYSTIC FIBROSIS AND DNA TESTS, supra note 62, at 33. 
 292. CONFERENCE ON GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 53 
(testimony of Mary Jo Ellis Kahn). 
 293. Billings et al., supra note 288, at 478. 
 294. Lori Andrews, Body Science, 83 A.B.A. J. 44, 47 (1997). 
 295. There are some limitations for using genetic testing as a loophole under group health 
insurance plans, due to the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, discussed infra 
Part IV.C. 
 
 296. Don’t Break It to Me, Doc (May 5, 1999), at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/ 
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The chilling irony of genetic testing is that, even in rare cases where a 
treatment exists, people may be afraid to get tested for the disorder because 
their insurer might drop them entirely or an employer may refuse to hire 
them based on their test results.297 Such is the case with hemochromatosis, a 
chronic, fatal disease in which too much iron builds up in the blood.298 It can 
be treated easily by periodic withdrawals of blood.299 Although his father and 
uncle both had the disease, a graduate student chose not to be genetically 
tested for it because he was worried about his job prospects.300 In another 
case, a man was tested for hemachromatosis and was treated successfully, but 
his insurer still dropped him on the grounds that he might stop taking the 
treatment and develop the costly disease.301 Similarly, relatives of people 
with Huntington’s disease have been refused health insurance.302 “People 
with von Hippel-Lindau (VHL) disease, a rare hereditary condition that can 
cause brain and kidney tumors, often find it hard to obtain health insurance 
because of the expensive surgeries they might need.”303 Parents of children at 
risk for VHL304 or for polycystic kidney disease305 often avoid having their 
children tested for the mutations because they fear the children will become 
uninsurable. 
Insurance in the United States is based on concepts of risk spreading and 
risk sharing.306 When most people’s future health risks are unknown, the 
future health care costs of a group can be predicted on an aggregate actuarial 
basis, and the costs can be spread across the whole group.307 As genetic 
technologies began to identify which currently healthy people will later 
develop particular diseases, insurance companies began to charge exorbitant 
amounts to people predicted to be at genetic risk or to deny them coverage 
entirely.308 At first glance, such a policy seems reasonable, for it is akin to 
0,1282,19500,00.html (last visited May 15, 2001). 
 297. Bob Groves, New Privacy Fight is All in the Genes, REC., July 18, 1999, at N04. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Wendy McGoodwin, Council for Responsible Genetics, Address at the ABA Annual Meeting 
(Aug. 1997). 
 302. Tim Beardsley, Vital Data, SCI. AM., Mar. 1996, at 100, 102. 
 303. Id. at 103. 
 304. See id. (interview with William C. Dickson, research management chair of the VHL Family 
Alliance). 
 305. See id. (interview with Gregory G. Germino, a researcher at Johns Hopkins University 
School of Medicine). 
 306. Meredith A. Jagutis, Insurer’s Access to Genetic Information: The Call for Comprehensive 
Federal Legislation, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 429, 432 (1999). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Karen Ann Jensen, Genetic Privacy in Washington State: Policy Considerations and a Model 
Genetic Privacy Act, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 357, 368 (1997). At one company, the job interviewer 
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charging higher rates to people who smoke. As dozens of genes are identified 
each week, however, the absurdity of this approach becomes apparent. 
Because each of us has between eight and twelve genetic defects,309 everyone 
could potentially become uninsurable. Alternatively, if everyone were 
charged an amount equal to their future medical costs, insurance would lose 
all of its risk-spreading benefits. 
The genetic revolution thus calls into question the current structure of 
health care financing in the United States, which is one of only two 
industrialized nations (the other being South Africa) that does not provide its 
citizens with universal access to health care.310 Even if the United States is 
not willing to introduce such an approach, the challenges raised by genetic 
services suggest that careful consideration should be given to the possibility 
of going back to a community rating system, whereby the costs of private 
health care insurance are spread over the entire population of a larger 
geographic area. A handful of states have already implemented this 
approach.311 
Just as insurance discrimination might occur based on genetic 
information, so might employment discrimination. A survey of U.S. 
geneticists revealed that many would share the patient’s genetic information 
with employers without the patient’s consent.312 Physicians are increasingly 
being put into the role of “double agents” with conflicting loyalties to the 
patient and to the patient’s school, employer, potential insurer, relative, or 
child.313 
There are numerous examples of employment discrimination based on 
genetic information. In the early 1970s, some employers discriminated 
against African American employees and job applicants who were carriers of 
learned the applicant’s father had Alzheimer’s disease. “‘I have single parents here,’ he reportedly told 
her, ‘and I don’t want their premiums to go up.’” Armour, supra note 290. 
 309. See ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT, supra note 146, at 134-35. 
 310. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 20. 
 311. “A community rating system effectively spreads the risks of health care utilization over a 
substantial portion of the population, which creates a more equitable distribution of the financial 
burden.” Katy Chi-Wen Li, The Private Insurance Industry’s Tactics Against Suspected Homosexuals: 
Redlining Based on Occupation, Residence and Marital Status, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 477, 500 (1996). 
At least eight states have enacted laws that require community rating in some instances of health 
insurance. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-98-110 (Michie 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6699 (West 1996); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:228.6 (West 1995); 1997 N.H. Laws 344; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 11, § 360.1-.12 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-130 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4080b 
(2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.43.005, 48.46.064, 48.46.066 (West 1999). 
 312. J.J. MULVIHILL ET AL., ETHICS AND HUMAN GENETICS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 
419, 440 (Dorthy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher eds., 1989). 
 313. DOROTHY NELKIN & LAWRENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS: THE SOCIAL 
POWER OF BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION 164 (1989). 
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the sickle cell anemia gene even though carrier status has no impact on an 
individual’s health or ability to perform his or her job.314 The only 
significance of sickle cell carrier status is that the carrier has a twenty-five 
percent chance of having a child with sickle cell anemia if he or she 
procreates with another carrier.315 More recently, a healthy carrier of the gene 
for Gaucher’s disease was denied a government job based on his carrier 
status.316 Another man was given restricted benefits and denied a promotion 
and job transfer because he and his son carry the gene for 
neurofibromatosis.317 A computer scientist was refused a job when his 
preemployment physical revealed that he had Klinefelter’s syndrome, a sex 
chromosome disorder occurring in one out of every 450 men.318 The 
syndrome can cause sterility but does not impact one’s ability to work.319 A 
social worker was fired when her employer learned her mother had died of 
Huntington’s disease.320 Another man claimed that he was not seriously ill 
during a preemployment physical.321 He had a genetic form of kidney disease 
but was asymptomatic.322 Nevertheless, the man’s potential employer 
withdrew the job offer on the ground that he had “lied”.323 
According to a 1999 survey of one thousand large and mid-size 
companies, over half of all new hires are subjected to medical examinations 
and “dozens of firms don’t inform applicants or employees about the types of 
tests being done.”324 Thirty percent of the companies surveyed obtain genetic 
information on their employees through testing or family histories, and seven 
percent use such information for hiring and promotion decisions.325 
Some employers test workers without their knowledge or consent. 
 314. ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS, supra note 75, at 18. 
 315. John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 441 
(1996). 
 316. Billings et al., supra note 288, at 478. 
 317. Jon Matthews, Bias Based on Genetic Testing Techniques, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 7, 1995, 
at A3. 
 318. Groves, supra note 297. 
 319. Klinefelter Syndrome and Associates, Sex Chromosome Variations—About 47XXY, at 
http://www.genetic.org/ks/scvs/47xxy.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2001). 
 320. Groves, supra note 297. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Genetic Discrimination: The Next Civil Rights Issue, AMERICAN HEALTH LINE, May 6, 1999, 
available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. See also Armour, supra note 290. 
 325. 1999 AMA SURVEY ON WORKPLACE TESTING: MEDICAL TESTING: SUMMARY OF KEY 
FINDINGS 2, available at http://www.amanet.org/research/medico/index.htm (last visited May 17, 
2001). An earlier study, a 1989 survey of companies by the Office of Technology Assessment of the 
U.S. Congress found that one in twenty companies conducted genetic screening or monitoring in the 
workplace. GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING, supra note 55, at 22. 
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Employees sued Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories, a University of California, 
Berkeley, laboratory funded by the U.S. Department of Energy.326 The suit 
alleged that the lab had tested African American employees for the sickle cell 
gene without their knowledge or consent during routine physicals and had 
secretly maintained the information in their files.327 A federal district court 
sided with the employer, finding that the practice did not invade the 
employees’ privacy because they had agreed to undergo physical exams and 
give medical histories even though the employees had not been told about the 
genetic testing.328 The judge found that given the “overall intrusiveness” of 
the physical exams and the “large overlap” between the medical histories and 
the tests, any additional privacy intrusions due to the challenged tests were 
minimal.329 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the 
district court and held that an employer may not test employees for “highly 
sensitive” medical and genetic information without the employees’ 
consent.330 The court stated that such “illicit”331 testing, if proved at trial, 
would be an invasion of privacy in violation of the California Constitution 
and the U.S. Constitution, and because of its differential impact on blacks 
and women, it would amount to job discrimination in violation of Title 
VII.332 Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for the unanimous three-judge 
panel, wrote: “One can think of few subject areas more personal and more 
likely to implicate privacy interests than that of one’s health or genetic 
makeup.”333 Judge Reinhardt also added that “it goes without saying that the 
most basic violation possible involves the performance of unauthorized 
tests—that is, the non-consensual retrieval of previously unrevealed medical 
information that may be unknown even to plaintiffs.”334 The court rejected 
the argument that the workers had effectively consented to the tests by 
agreeing to undergo the medical exam, filling out medical questionnaires, 
and giving blood and urine samples.335 The court held that none of these acts 
was the same as authorizing a genetic test.336 The court allowed the job 
 326. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 327. The judge also indicated that the intrusion was not actionable since the workers’ employment 
apparently had not been affected by the test. Id. at 1266. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 1269. 
 330. See id. at 1268. 
 331. Id. at 1269. 
 332. Id. at 1275. 
 333. Id. at 1269. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269. 
 336. Id. at 1270. 
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discrimination claims to proceed, finding that the allegations “fall neatly into 
a Title VII framework.”337 Because only women were tested for pregnancy 
and only African Americans were tested for the sickle cell trait, the court 
stated that “the employment of women and blacks at Lawrence was 
conditioned, in part on allegedly unconstitutional invasions of privacy to 
which white and/or male employees were not subjected.”338 Further, Judge 
Reinhardt noted that even if different testing requirements based on sex, race, 
and pregnancy were unconstitutional, they would still be a valid basis for a 
Title VII discrimination claim.339 
The availability of genetic technologies also changes people’s 
relationships with legal institutions. Courts are increasingly asked to mandate 
genetic testing, not for medical treatment, but to serve as the basis for a 
decision in a lawsuit. Judges have begun to accept—and even require—
genetic information in a variety of cases. For judges with a complex, busy 
caseload, the idea that genetic information may provide legal guidance is 
seductive. Consequently, the use of genetic testing to answer legal questions 
is growing, without sufficient thought to the social context or social impact. 
Through DNA testing, a fifteen-year-old child may find out that her 
biological father is a man she has never met. Giving that man visitation rights 
simply because of a genetic bond proven through DNA testing, however, 
may be terribly disruptive. 
In a South Carolina case, a judge actually ordered a woman to undergo 
Huntington’s disease testing in order to terminate her parental rights.340 This 
may foreshadow genetic battles in custody cases where divorcing spouses 
each seek genetic testing on the other in order to see which one is less likely 
to get cancer or heart disease and thus more likely to live longer. Such an 
evidentiary quest may put quantity of time with the child above quality since 
the quality of a parental relationship is more difficult to measure and prove 
than the presence or absence of a particular gene. Under this approach, the 
child may not actually end up with the “better” parent. 
An even more explosive area of genetic testing may be in cases involving 
personal injury.341 Currently, if an injured individual wins a case involving 
medical malpractice, an auto accident, or other tort, he or she is awarded 
 337. Id. at 1272. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Berkeley County Dept. of Social Services v. David Galley and Kimberly Galley, No. 92-DR-
08-2699 (Moncks Corner, S.C., Apr. 19, 1994). 
 341. See Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by Defendants 
Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877 (1996). 
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damages based on statistics about the life expectancy of a person that age.342 
Savvy defendants may begin to require genetic testing of plaintiffs to prove 
that there is a genetic reason that the plaintiff may die earlier than expected, 
so that the defendant will have to pay less in damages. When a chemical 
company was sued by parties on behalf of a child allegedly damaged by the 
company’s toxins, the company persuaded a judge to order genetic testing on 
the boy in an attempt to prove that his problem was genetic and not due to 
exposure.343 Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald argue that, in suits against 
tobacco companies, the companies may be able to avoid liability if they 
blame the cancers on the plaintiff’s genetic “susceptibilities”.344 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are now beginning to order genetic testing on their 
clients in order to stave off defendants’ claims that the client’s condition was 
not due to their negligence.345 In one such case, the medical malpractice 
defendant claimed that a child’s mental retardation was the result of Opitz-
Frias Syndrome, a genetic disorder. When testing revealed the condition was 
not genetic, the defendant settled for $1.75 million.346 
The implications of such legal maneuvers are profound. What if 
unforeseen genetic mutations are found when a plaintiff’s lawyer orders 
genetic tests on a child? Although possibly irrelevant to the case, they could 
have a potentially lasting impact on the child, the child’s parents, and the 
child’s treatment by teachers, insurers, and future employers. 
In the coming years, anyone who brings a personal injury claim or 
custody claim may be forced to undergo genetic testing. Given the enormous 
psychological and social impact of genetic information, many people who 
have been injured may be deterred from suing if there is a risk that a judge 
will force them to learn their genetic makeup. In the South Carolina suit, the 
woman who did not want to be tested for Huntington’s disease347 faced a 
painful choice: either learn whether or not she was predisposed to an 
 342. Id. at 878 n.1. 
 343. Meg Fletcher, Genetic Testing Ordered in Product Liability Case, BUS. INS., Aug. 1, 1994, at 
1, available at NEXIS, Lexis Library, News Group File. 
 344. RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: HOW GENETIC 
INFORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS, 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCERS (1993). Rebecca Pentz has pointed out 
that tobacco companies “claim that smoking only causes cancer in those with a genetic 
susceptibility—implying that if we just fix the genes there is no need to stop buying and using their 
product.” Rebecca D. Pentz, Commentary on “Ethical Issues in Genetic Engineering, Screening and 
Testing,” by P. Michael Conneally 1-2 (Nov. 1996) (paper for Conference on Culture and Biology, 
Galveston, Texas). 
 345. Don Babwin, Meet the New Building Block of Legal Life: Genetics, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 
1999, at 1, available at NEXIS, Lexis Library, News Group File. 
 346. Id. (citing Dewey v. Zack, 651 N.E.2d 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)). 
 347. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT, supra note 146, at 144. 
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untreatable disease or give up the chance to seek custody of her child.348 She 
“decided to disappear—even though it would mean not seeing her child—
rather than be tested.”349 
This legal trend is a contributing factor of the growing genetic 
determinism taking place today. Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee draw 
attention to the way genetics is increasingly being used to explain 
behavior.350 They note that since 1983, when the category behavioral 
genetics first appeared in the Reader’s Guide to Periodic Literature, 
hundreds of articles on that topic have appeared and “among the traits 
attributed to heredity have been mental illness, aggression, homosexuality, 
exhibitionism, dyslexia, addiction, job and educational success, arson, 
tendency to tease, propensity for risk taking, timidity, social potency, 
tendency to giggle or to use hurtful words, traditionalism, and zest for 
life.”351 They also show how these ideas have influenced popular culture in 
the form of novels, movies, soap operas, and advertisements.352 
Nelkin and Lindee discuss why such explanations are readily accepted by 
the public by explaining that they can “relieve personal guilt by implying 
compulsion, an inborn inability to resist specific behavior.”353 In addition, 
they can relieve societal guilt and excuse social services cutbacks by 
deflecting attention away from social and economic influences on 
behavior.354 
VI. APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION TO THE EXISTING 
LEGAL MODELS 
The serious impact of genetic technologies and genetic information 
necessitate the regulation of this field. The results of various empirical 
studies indicate the importance of personal autonomy over whether 
individuals are subject to genetic testing and who has access to those results. 
They also indicate the need for better quality assurance mechanisms to 
achieve these goals. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CULTURAL 
ICON 82 (1995). 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 145. 
 354. Id. 
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A. The Medical Model 
Under the medical model, there are problems with relying on physicians 
to disseminate new genetic information. Physicians might not offer a test 
because of their own personality traits. A study by Neil Holtzman and his 
colleagues at Johns Hopkins found that a particular personality trait, 
tolerance for ambiguity, influenced whether physicians would offer patients 
genetic testing.355 In addition, the physician’s gender can affect what services 
he or she offers. Surveys of medical students revealed that eighty-five 
percent of male medical students (compared to seventeen percent of female 
medical students) would not offer artificial insemination to a couple in which 
the man was at-risk for Huntington’s disease, despite the fact that half the at-
risk men claim they are willing to use donor sperm.356 A physician’s 
religious beliefs or political views may also influence whether or not he or 
she informs patients of the availability of genetic services. When Vanderbilt 
researchers tried to recruit pediatricians to offer free cystic fibrosis carrier 
screening to the general population, the pediatricians refused because of their 
personal beliefs regarding abortion.357 The physicians did not want to tell 
couples that such testing was available because couples made up of carriers 
might choose to abort an affected fetus following prenatal diagnosis.358 
Consequently, people often learn about genetic services from sources other 
than physicians. In a study of 520 women who had undergone amniocentesis, 
only thirty-six percent had first learned about the procedure from their 
obstetrician.359 Meanwhile, a similar percentage, thirty-six percent, first 
learned about the procedure from the media.360 
Even when a physician offers the test, he or she may provide incorrect 
information to the patient. In a study of obstetricians in Rochester, New 
York, thirty-eight percent of ob-gyns surveyed incorrectly believed that one 
needed to have an affected relative in order to have a child with cystic 
fibrosis, and forty-three percent believed that CF only affected children of a 
 355. See Gail Geller et al., Measuring Physicians’ Tolerance for Ambiguity and its Relationship to 
Their Repeated Practices Regarding Genetic Testing, 31 MED. CARE 989 (1993). 
 356. Sandra Leiblum & Christopher Barbrack, Artificial Insemination by Donor: A Survey of 
Attitudes and Knowledge in Medical Students and Infertile Couples, 15 J. BIOSOCIAL SCI. 165, tbl. 3, 
at 170 (1983). 
 357. Ellen Wright Clayton, CF Pilot Study, Presentation at Cystic Fibrosis Grantee Meeting, 
National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD (Sept. 8-10, 1993). 
 358. See id. 
 359. Margaret M. McGovern et al., Acceptability of Chorionic Villi Sampling for Prenatal 
Diagnosis, 155 AM. J. OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 25, 27 (1986). 
 360. Id. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p221 Andrews.doc  7/17/01   5:01 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
268 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:221 
 
 
 
 
 
particular sex.361 In a Johns Hopkins study, ninety-nine percent of geneticists 
but approximately fifty-six percent of ob-gyns knew, that when only one 
parent was a carrier, there was almost no chance of having a CF child.362 In 
another study, twenty percent of the sickle cell carriers had the 
“misconception that sickle cell trait is a mild disease,” due to misinformation 
they received from their doctors.363  
Physicians may coerce or mislead people into undergoing genetic testing 
because of their own beliefs about the type of information people should 
want or the kind of children who should be born, or even because of their 
own fear of legal liability if they failed to test someone. Even the language 
that physicians and genetic counselors use about testing exerts a subtle 
coercion. For example, patients who undergo genetic testing are described as 
“brave and courageous.” Even the decision to have a prophylactic 
mastectomy is described as “courageous.”364 People who decide not to have 
genetic testing are described as “avoiders”. 
Under the medical model, only cursory attention is paid to informed 
consent. Genetic testing is now sometimes undertaken on behalf of people, 
particularly pregnant women, without their advance notice or informed 
consent.365 For example, obstetricians routinely test pregnant African 
American women for the gene for sickle cell anemia without informing them 
in advance or asking for their consent.366 Only when bad results indicate that 
the woman is a sickle cell anemia carrier is she informed.367 
The problem of informed consent is exacerbated by multiplex testing, 
whereby numerous genetic tests can be performed on a single tissue 
sample.368 As a result, people will be offered prenatal testing for a greater 
range of disorders in situations in which there is no family history or other 
personal familiarity with the disorder. How health care providers describe the 
disorders will influence whether people will choose to undergo testing and 
 361. Peter T. Rowley et al., Cystic Fibrosis Carrier Screening: Knowledge and Attitudes of 
Prenatal Care Providers, 9 AM. J. PREVENTION MED. 261, 265 (1993). 
 362. Neil A. Holtzman, Primary Care Physicians as Providers of Frontline Genetic Services, 8 
FETAL DIAGNOSTIC THERAPY 213, 216 (1993). 
 363. Stamatoyannopoulos, supra note 182, at 273. 
 364. Professor Michael Baum, who diagnosed Jenny Revill (the first woman in Britain to have a 
prophylactic mastectomy) called her surgical decision “courageous”. Revill, supra note 142. 
Nonetheless, Jenny says “nothing prepared me for the loss. . . . It was far more emotionally traumatic 
than I had expected.” Id. 
 365. For an example of a research protocol in which sickle cell anemia screening was undertaken 
without informed consent, see Peter T. Rowley et al., Do Pregnant Women Benefit From 
Hemoglobinopathy Carrier Detection?, 565 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 152 (1989). 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 177-78. 
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whether women will choose to abort their fetuses based on the results. The 
fact that many tests will be undertaken on a single sample has led some 
physicians to decide against specifically informing patients about the genetic 
disorders being tested for before multiplex testing. Information, education, 
and counseling would be provided only after the individual tested positive 
for a genetic disorder.369 
It does not seem appropriate to apply the medical model to genetic 
technologies, which can profoundly impact our self-image, intimate 
relationships, and childbearing plans. The model does not provide assurances 
that the information people receive is accurate. The medical model’s 
treatment of quality assurance, or subsequent malpractice liability, is 
inadequate protection because errors in late-onset genetic disease testing may 
not be discovered until decades later. Even with respect to errors that may be 
discovered in the short term (such as failure to offer prenatal diagnosis that 
result in the birth of an affected child), litigation is not sufficient. Some 
judges have stated that unless patients tell doctors that they are in a high-risk 
group for a particular genetic disease, the doctors do not have to tell them 
about testing for that disease.370 Such an approach puts too heavy an onus on 
patients for them to decipher much genetic meaning out of their family 
history. Moreover, some types of malpractice suits in the genetic realm are 
prohibited by statute. Wrongful life suits are barred in nine states,371 and 
wrongful birth suits are not allowed in seven states.372 In the latter states, the 
physicians and labs cannot be sued for negligence if the couple carried to 
term a pregnancy they would have terminated regardless of the results. 
B. The Public Health Model 
Some genetics researchers and professionals, as well as some legal 
commentators, insist that genetic testing and treatment should be governed 
by a public health model. Other commentators may fail to realize that they 
 369. Sherman Elias & George Annas, Generic Consent for Genetic Screening, 330 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1611, 1612 (1994). 
 370. See, e.g., Munro v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 371. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (Deering 2001); IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Michie 2000); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (Michie 2000); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 145.424 (West 2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (2000); 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (Michie 2000); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (2000). 
 
 372. IDAHO Code § 5-334 (Michie 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424(2) (West 1998); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (West 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e) (1993) (providing that doctors 
cannot be sued for refusing to participate in procedures that could result in abortion); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (West 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (Michie 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-11-24 (1996 & Supp. 2000). 
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are evoking a public health model when they make policy recommendations 
or discuss genetic obligations using language associated with public health. 
For example, language advocating the “prevention” of a genetic disease, 
analogies to infectious disease, and prevention directed toward contraception 
and abortion use language of the public health model.373 The “impropriety” 
of allowing affected children to be born is also suggested in articles that 
discuss the financial cost of genetic disorders to society by providing figures 
relating to the annual costs of care per patient.374 
An increasing number of articles advocate a public health approach to 
genetics and various commentators argue that people have a duty to learn 
their genetic status. Dr. B. Meredith Burke states that teens should be 
required to have genetic tests when they become sexually active.375 Allowing 
minors to refuse genetic testing, says Burke, “downplays the moral and legal 
obligation to protect an innocent bystander,” namely, the fetus.376  
There are other policies that could be adopted to further the public health 
model application. One is the imposition of tort liability for not sharing 
genetic information with relatives or for not undergoing genetic testing. A 
California case, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, suggested that a 
child born with Tay-Sachs, a genetic disease, could bring suit against her 
parents for not undergoing prenatal screening and aborting her.377 Some 
commentators go further and suggest that people should be criminally liable 
for not making use of genetic services. Lawyer and physician Margery Shaw, 
for example, recommends that states adopt policies to prevent the birth of 
children with genetic diseases.378 She suggests that the prevention of genetic 
disease is so important that couples who decide to give birth to a child with a 
serious genetic disorder should be criminally liable for child abuse.379 
In many instaces, the analysis of why the public health model is 
appropriate is very superficial. For example, researchers who wish to use 
patients’ blood samples without their permission to obtain breast cancer 
incidence data claim that their actions are appropriate because breast cancer 
 373. George Cunningham, Maternal Serum Alpha-Fetoprotein Screening in California 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 374. See, e.g., Peter T. Rowley et al., supra note 361, at 261 (noting average cost for a patient with 
cystic fibrosis is $10,000 and total direct costs may be $300,000,000); Benjamin S. Wilfond & 
Norman Fost, The Cystic Fibrosis Gene: Medical and Social Implication for Heterozygote Detection, 
263 JAMA 2777, 2781 (1990) (estimating the average annual cost $7,500 and lifetime costs at least 
$200,000). 
 375. B. Meredith Burke, Genetic Testing for Children and Adolescents, 273 JAMA 1089 (1995). 
 376. Id. 
 377. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 378. Shaw, supra note 285. 
 379. Id. 
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is a “public health threat.”380 However, the mere fact that a disease affects 
numerous people,381 and is thus a major societal concern, does not mean that 
it is a public health threat. Most often, that term applies to imminently 
dangerous disorders that are highly contagious and put the public at risk. 
Many commentators have argued that genetic testing should have a role 
in public health education. With respect to antismoking campaigns, for 
example, it is thought that people who know they have a genetic mutation 
that predisposes them to lung cancer would be more likely to quit smoking. 
The rationale is that genetic testing translates a general risk into an 
individualized risk, thus increasing the person’s fear and making it more 
likely that he or she will change his or her behavior. The problem, however, 
is that genetic information has such a powerful impact that it can make 
people too fearful to undertake preventive efforts. This is exactly what 
happened in a study that incorporated genetic information into a smoking 
cessation program.382 People who learned that they were at higher risk for 
lung cancer were no more likely to quit smoking than people who did not 
have that genetic information.383 However, the people who had the genetic 
information were more depressed and fearful.384 The researchers concluded 
that the use of genetic testing may cause their plans to backfire: “Distress 
could lead some smokers to deny or to underestimate their smoking problem, 
which would increase resistance to behavioral change. Distress could also 
promote smoking to achieve the mood-enhancing effects of nicotine.”385 
In many ways, the traditional public health model does not meet the task 
of providing education about genetics.386 The goals of public health 
educators are to change behavior to prevent disease, and to change attitudes 
and values leading to behavior changes. This is not the proper way to 
approach genetics.387 Many genetic disorders cannot be prevented; what is 
being prevented is the birth of children with these disorders. There is far less 
societal consensus on the appropriateness of aborting (or not conceiving) 
 380. See, e.g., Marc Landy & Kyle D. Dell, The Failure of Risk Reform Legislation in the 104th 
Congress, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 113, 127 (1998). 
 381. However, even though many women suffer from breast cancer, only five to ten percent of 
women with breast cancer have a hereditary form of the disease. Scientists Report New Lead in the 
Genetics of Breast Cancer, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 29, 1995, available at NEXIS, Lexis Library, News 
Group File. 
 382. Caryn Lerman et al., Incorporating Biomarkers of Exposure and Genetic Susceptibility Into 
Smoking Cessation Treatment: Effects on Smoking-Related Cognitions, Emotions, and Behavioral 
Change, 16 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 87, 96 (1997). 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. (references omitted). 
 386. Id. at 94. 
 
 387. Id. 
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affected fetuses than there is on the goals of quitting smoking, preventing 
heart attacks, or eradicating infectious diseases. 
Nor is there a clear justification for the public health approach of 
mandating genetic services. Currently, states use the public health model to 
mandate the use of genetic services by requiring newborn genetic 
screening.388 But there is less need to mandate testing now than in the late 
1960s when newborn screening programs began. If a genetic disorder can be 
diagnosed in children and prevented or treated during childhood, there is 
reason to believe that in today’s litigious climate, private physicians will 
offer genetic testing, thereby lessening the need for state interference. 
Moreover, mandatory screening does not meet its public health goal. The 
government argument that it has a right to test children without parental 
consent to help the children is undercut by the fact that test results are rarely 
used.389 Most states do not provide funding for the necessary treatments, so 
poorer children do not receive them.390 In addition, since the public health 
model does not require parents to be informed about the test and consent to 
it, there is less accountability in the system, since parents will not know to 
check if the test has actually been done. By mandating testing and 
eliminating the requirement that health care professionals inform patients 
about the test, there is also a missed opportunity to educate people about 
genetics in general. Such information could help them in other decision-
making situations. 
It is possible that states may begin mandating genetic testing of adults: in 
particular, the genetic testing of pregnant women. Currently, a growing 
number of pregnant women receive genetic information about their fetuses’ 
well-being through fetal blood sampling, chorionic villi sampling, 
amniocentesis, maternal serum alphafetoprotein screening, and other 
technologies.391 However, the information is obtained at some risk to the 
fetus itself.392 On the other hand, fetal cell sorting provides information about 
the fetus without creating a physical risk to the fetus or the pregnant 
 388. See supra notes 98-99, 103-04 and accompanying text. 
 389. Ellen Wright Clayton, Screening and the Treatment of Newborns, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 85, 104 
n.84 (1992). 
 390. See id. at 129-30. 
 391. In the State of New York alone, 25,000 women per year are screened for fetal genetic 
abnormalities. Kimberly Nobles, Birthright or Life Sentence: Controlling the Threat of Genetic 
Testing, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2081, 2087 (1992). Michael Malinowski notes that “[o]ne reason for our 
acceptance of extensive prenatal genetic screening is that it is being introduced to us through the health 
profession rather than through a social movement.” Michael Malinowski, Coming into Being: Law, 
Ethics, and the Practice of Prenatal Genetic Screening, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1453 (1994). 
 392. See, e.g., Chorionic Villus Sampling and Subsequent Abortion, 50 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 
1368 (1994); Golbus et al., supra note 137. 
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woman.393 A “simple” blood test is performed on the woman.394 Geneticists 
utilize complex procedures to capture minute amounts of fetal blood cells 
circulating in the woman’s blood.395 They undertake prenatal diagnosis on 
these cells to determine whether the fetus has Down syndrome,396 cystic 
fibrosis,397 Tay-Sachs disease,398 or other disorders. If states begin to 
mandate such screening, the purpose would be to guide the reproductive 
decisions of the couples who receive the information. 
The advent of fetal cell sorting raises an important policy issue regarding 
women’s control over prenatal testing. Because the procedure does not create 
a physical risk to the fetus or the woman, there may be a trend toward 
undertaking the testing without the woman’s consent. In fact, some of the 
researchers developing this technique suggested that it could be used to 
screen large populations of women.399 A group of researchers noted that:  
because the . . . procedure requires sampling of maternal blood rather 
than amniotic fluid, it could make widespread screening in younger 
women feasible . . . . Widespread screening is desirable because the 
relatively large number of pregnancies in women below 35 years old 
means that they bear the majority of children with chromosomal 
abnormalities despite the relatively low risk of such abnormalities in 
pregnancies in this age group.400 
Some medical commentators have suggested taking a public health 
approach to the issue of genetic privacy by allowing physicians to breach a 
patient’s confidentiality and warn the patient’s relatives that they may also 
have a particular mutant gene, or imposing tort liability on people for not 
sharing genetic information with relatives. The commentators rely on public 
health precedents that allow doctors to warn third parties about their patients’ 
 393. For a description of the technology, see Sherman Elias et al., First Trimester Diagnosis of 
Trisomy 21 in Fetal Cells from Maternal Blood, 340 LANCET 1033 (1992). See also Jane Chuen & 
Mitchell S. Golbus, Prenatal Diagnosis Using Fetal Cells from the Maternal Circulation, 159 W. J. 
MED. 308 (1993); Richard Saltus, Noninvasive Way is Cited to Deter Down Syndrome in Fetuses, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1992, at 8. 
 394. Elias et al., supra note 393. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Down syndrome is caused by extra genetic material on chromosome 21, which results in 
various malformations and mental retardation. Committee on Genetics, Health Supervision of Children 
with Down Syndrome, 93 PEDIATRICS 855 (1994). 
 397. See supra text accompanying note 43 (description of cystic fibrosis). 
 398. See supra text accompanying note 18 (description of Tay-Sachs disease). 
 399. Leonard A. Herzenberg et al., Fetal Cells in the Blood of Pregnant Women: Detection and 
Enrichment by Fluorescence-Activated Cell Sorting, 76 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 1453, 1455 
(1979). 
 400. Id. 
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violent proclivities401 or infectious diseases.402 The case of genetic disease, 
however, differs from that of violence and infectious disease. There are 
already established social policies aimed at preventing violence or the spread 
of infectious diseases. Criminal laws prohibit violence, and public health 
laws require reporting infectious diseases and preventing their spread. Thus, 
breach of doctor-patient confidentiality under such circumstances furthers an 
established social policy. In contrast, society’s position on genetic disease is 
not so clear cut. For example, no laws have been adopted to prevent the birth 
of children with genetic disorders. 
The legal cases involving infectious disease and violence could be 
interpreted as offering no precedent for a privilege or duty for health care 
providers to breach doctor-patient confidentiality to warn relatives of a 
genetic risk. In the genetics context, the patient is not the cause of the 
relative’s potential genetic mutation.403 Warning siblings or cousins about 
genetic risks will not prevent them from having the genetic mutation that has 
already been programmed at conception, although it might prevent a 
particularly risky gene-environment interaction.404 Although warning the 
relatives about their genetic risk may prevent them from conceiving a child 
with the same gene, such a future occurrence is not the type of serious, 
imminent harm required in cases mandating disclosure by physicians to third 
parties. 
Even if the state has a valid, compelling interest in furthering the birth of 
healthy children, mandating prenatal screening and mandatory disclosure of 
genetic status to relatives arguably does not further that interest. Since 
treatment for the screened-for disorders is generally not available, testing 
encourages the abortion of affected fetuses and deters carriers from having 
more children, rather than promoting the birth of healthy children.405 Because 
the state cannot show that the policy improves the health of potential 
children, it will likely argue that such a policy advances a state interest in 
 401. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
 402. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920). 
 403. In the infectious disease cases, there was no duty to warn if the third party would have gotten 
the disease anyway. See Britton v. Soltes, 563 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Skillings v. Allen, 180 
N.W. 916 (Minn. 1921).. 
 404. For example, a person with a genetic disposition to lung cancer might chose not to smoke. 
 
 405. The outcome of the legal analysis would change very little even if treatment were available. 
If the disorder at issue could be treated after birth, then testing the newborn infant would be a less 
restrictive alternative with respect to the woman than prenatal testing. If the disorder needed to be 
treated while the fetus was in utero, the case for prenatal testing would be stronger, but would still fail 
since the treatment would likely be more intrusive than the blood test and invade the woman’s bodily 
integrity and interfere with her right to privacy. Since the woman would be able to refuse the treatment 
under In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1994), the state could not show that the testing would assure that the fetus was treated in the end. 
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saving money by discouraging the birth of children with genetic disorders. 
However, a state interest in saving money should not override a woman’s 
right to refuse medical intervention.406 In particular, the potential burden on 
the state in caring for children has not been proven to be a compelling 
interest in other contexts.407 
State-mandated genetic testing for diseases that are not readily treatable 
devalues people with disorders for which tests are available. By compelling 
fetal cell sorting, for example, the government would be directly influencing 
the type of children born in our society. Such intereference smacks of 
government-initiated eugenics. Government control of the traits of children is 
inappropriate, despite arguments that it would “upgrade” some characteristics 
of the population.408 
There are other dangers in misusing the public health approach. 
Interventions may be adopted before their risks have been assessed 
adequately. In the past, well-meaning genetics programs were adopted 
prematurely and caused unintended yet significant harm.409 In the late 1960s, 
state public health departments began mandatory screening of all infants for 
PKU which is a genetic disorder that can cause mental retardation if the child 
is not put on a special low phenylalanine diet shortly after birth.410 Because 
the program was implemented without adequate research or monitoring of 
the children treated, some infants who did not have PKU died or suffered 
 406. The U.S. Supreme Court has not found the goal of protecting the public treasury to be 
superior to that of protecting individual rights. A person’s right to travel is recognized as more 
important than the drain on the welfare system of the state to which he or she moves. See, e.g., 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
 407. For example, in People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), a pregnant, 
unmarried woman with two children was convicted of second degree robbery. A condition of her 
probation was that she would not become pregnant without being married so that the state taxpayers 
would be spared the burden of caring for illegitimate children. Id. at 292. Because the court did not 
view the state interest in saving money as overriding a woman’s interest in childbearing, it is unlikely 
that the state’s interest would have much weight in a genetic testing situation. See id. at 293. 
Moreover, it is also unclear whether the state could prove through a cost-benefit analysis that 
screening saves a sufficient amount of money to justify infringing upon individual choice. For 
example, the overall costs of screening and providing counseling and other services for all pregnant 
women might exceed the costs of supporting affected children. With respect to cystic fibrosis, “[i]t has 
been estimated that if a national [carrier] screening program were introduced, it would cost $2.2 
million for each case of cystic fibrosis avoided.” Benjamin P. Sachs & Bruce Korf, The Human 
Genome Project: Implications for the Practicing Obstetrician, 81 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 458, 
459 (1993). 
 408. See Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
967, 999 (1996) (discussing affect of parents’ liberty interest in childrearing decisions on the traits of 
the children). 
 409. See Neil A. Holtzman, Dietary Treatment for Inborn Errors of Metabolism, 21 ANN. REV. 
MED. 335 (1970). 
 410. Id. 
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irreversible damage when put on the special diet.411 
Some prior public health uses of genetic services have ignored the social 
and psychological impacts of genetic technologies. The laws establishing 
mandatory sickle cell anemia carrier status screening programs in the 1970s 
did not provide adequate counseling or sufficient confidentiality 
protections.412 The people identified by testing as carriers of the sickle cell 
gene were stigmatized and discriminated against in insurance and 
employment.413 
The empirical data about the potential negative impacts of genetic testing 
on people’s emotional well-being, self-concept, personal relationships, and 
relationships with insurers and employers would argue against requiring 
people to learn their genotype against their will. Prevention, the traditional 
public health goal, does not readily apply to many genetic diseases. 
Consequently, when the Royal College of Physicians of London listed 
“prevention” as one of the aims of clinical genetics,414 geneticist Angus 
Clarke attacked the idea of making prevention a specific goal: 
If we include such prevention of genetic disorders amongst our aims, 
we immediately abandon the non-directive nature of genetic 
counselling in favour of a genetic public health policy, or eugenics. It 
is impossible to maintain a sincerely non-directive approach to 
counselling about a genetic disorder whilst simultaneously aiming to 
prevent that disorder: the opportunities for insider dealing are too great 
. . . . Its very name clearly conveys the impression that any birth of a 
child with a genetic disorder represents a medical failure, at least until 
proved otherwise. This public espousal of prevention, with the 
unfortunate choice of name, will ensure that the College’s initiative is 
seen as eugenic . . . .415 
The public health approach to genetic services may also raise problems 
with quality assurance. Some state public health departments have found that 
as legislatures add more and more tests to the newborn screening mandate, 
they barely have enough money to test for each disorder, let alone design 
programs for quality assurance.416 Although the Centers for Disease Control 
 411. Id. 
 412. See PHILIP REILLY, GENETICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY 62-86 (1977). 
 413. Id. 
 414. THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON, PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND GENETIC 
SCREENING: COMMUNITY AND SERVICE IMPLICATIONS (1989). 
 415. Angus Clarke, Is Non-Directive Genetic Counselling Possible?, 338 LANCET 998, 999 
(1991). 
 416. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 133. 
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and Prevention (CDC) has, at times, established admirable quality assurance 
programs for state public health departments, the CDC budget has at other 
times been insufficient to offer such quality programs.417 Quality assurance 
under a public health approach is thus subject to political budget setting and 
is not a secure way to ensure adequate quality. 
C. The Fundamental Rights Model 
Under the fundamental rights approach, people are entitled to more 
information about medical services than under the medical model or public 
health model. Invoking this approach in the genetic context, a number of 
court cases dealt with physicians’ failure to advise pregnant women over age 
thirty-five of the availability of prenatal testing, such as amniocentesis. The 
women in these cases had subsequently given birth to an affected child.418 
The physicians were held liable for not informing pregnant women about the 
availability of genetic testing even though, under a medical model, the 
medical standard of care at the time did not require physicians to give such 
information. 
Currently, the fundamental rights approach has been limited to genetics 
research and genetics services in the reproductive context. However, this 
approach could be expanded to include decisions about other types of 
genetics services. It could be argued that genetic information is so central to 
one’s own identity that decisions about whether or not to obtain such 
information and the potential uses of such information should be deemed a 
fundamental rights issue even when reproduction is not involved. An 
additional rationale for protecting genetics services under a fundamental 
rights model is that it has implications for one’s freedom of association, a 
constitutionally protected right.419 Information about a person’s genetic status 
may influence whether someone wants to marry, employ, or otherwise 
associate with another person. 
Under the fundamental rights approach, individuals would be entitled to 
extensive information about the genetics services that could be provided to 
them in the nonreproductive context (such as information about the 
availability of testing for genes associated with cancer), as well as in the 
reproductive context. Such an entitlement would be an incentive for 
physicians to learn about the technologies involved in genetic testing. The 
 417. Id. 
 418. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808 (N.Y. 1978). 
 419. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 
(1980). 
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idea of educating physicians to deter negligent conduct has been used as a 
rationale in wrongful life and wrongful birth cases.420 
In addition, participation in genetics services would be voluntary under 
the fundamental rights model. Concerned by the various psychological and 
social risks of genetic testing, various blue ribbon panels of government, 
ethics organizations, and entities such as the Institute of Medicine have 
recommended such approach.421 In Reproductive Genetic Testing: Impact 
Upon Women, for example, the NIH Workshop recommended that 
“[r]eproductive genetic services should be meticulously voluntary.”422 
Under a fundamental rights model, there would be equal protection under 
the law and a person’s genetic status would not be a permissible basis for 
discrimination by societal institutions. Currently, in the United States, 
policymakers have not adequately tackled the issues of genetic privacy and 
genetic discrimination. Six states have statutes prohibiting general genetic 
testing in general without informed consent,423 but they provide tenuous 
protection due to the exceptions to the statutes. In five of the six states, the 
police can gain access to tissue samples for genetic information.424 Four of 
the six state statutes have exceptions allowing researchers access to genetic 
samples without the individual’s knowledge or consent.425 The laws that have 
been adopted in recent years to protect against genetic discrimination in 
insurance also have loopholes. Thirty-four states prohibit denying people 
health insurance based on certain types of genetic information.426 Of these, 
 420. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979). 
 421. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 52, at 276. 
 422. NIH Workshop Statement, 8 FETAL DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 6, 7 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 423. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1221(a) (2000); FLA. STAT. ch. 760.40 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 629.151 (Michie 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4 (Michie 2000); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS § 79-
4(2) (McKinney 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9332 (2001). 
 424. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1221(b)(1) (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 760.40(2)(a) (2000); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629.151(1) (Michie 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(c)(1) (Michie 2000); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9332(3) (2001). 
 425. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1221(b)(5) (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629.151(4) (Michie 
2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(c)(9) (Michie 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9332(5)(d) (2001). 
 426. Twenty-nine states prohibit denial of insurance based on certain genetic information. See 
ALA. CODE § 27-53-2(b) (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-448(D) (2000); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(b) 
(Deering 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(d) (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2317(b) 
(2000); FLA. STAT. § 627.4301(2)(a) (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-51-4 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 431:10A-118(a)(1) (Michie 2000); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/20 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 27-8-26-7 (Michie 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2259(b)(3) (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 304.12-085(2)(a) (Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:213.7(B)(1)(a) (West 2000); MD. CODE 
ANN., INS. § 27-909(c)(1) (2001); MINN. STAT. § 72A-139(3) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-
206(3) (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2(II) (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12(1)(e) (West 
2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4(b) (Michie 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-215(c)(2) (2000); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.64(B)(4) (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3614.1(C)(2) (West 
2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135(3) (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-20(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. 2001); 
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thirty states also prohibit conditioning the provisions of coverage on genetic 
information,427 and twenty-seven states prohibit the use of a person’s genetic 
information to set rates.428 But most of these laws do not protect people from 
discrimination based on genetic information about their relatives. In twenty-
six of the thirty-four states, insurers can easily circumvent the reach of the 
laws by basing their decisions on family histories.429 In addition, in most 
states, insurers can get around the laws by discriminating against people 
based not on their test result, but on the fact that they previously requested 
genetic services. Only twelve states prohibit such discrimination.430 
Moreover, because of federal preemption under a statute known as the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),431 the state prohibitions 
on genetic discrimination do not cover self-funded insurance plans. Yet at 
least sixty-five percent of all companies and eighty-two percent of companies 
with more than 5,000 employees are self-insured.432 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2703 (2000); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.73 Sec. 3(a) (Vernon 2000); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9334 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4(B)(1) (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. 
§ 631.89(2)(c) (2000). Four states prohibit insurers from requiring genetic tests. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 24-A, § 2159(C)(2) (West 2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1306 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 689A.417(1)(a) (Michie 2001); WIS. STAT. § 631.89(2)(a) (2000). In addition, Nebraska has 
established a commission to review genetic discrimination in insurance. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-8102 
(2000). 
 427. For a list of the twenty-nine states that prohibit such conditioning, see supra note 426. 
 428. See ALA. CODE § 27-53-2(b) (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-448(F) (2000); CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10143 (Deering 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-118(a)(1) (Michie 2000); 410 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 513/20 (2000); IND. CODE ANN.§ 27-8-26-5(3) (Michie 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
2259(b)(4) (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-085(1) (Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22:213.7(b)(1) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159C(2) (West 2000); MD. CODE 
ANN., INS. § 27-909(c)(1) (2000); MINN. STAT. § 72A-139(4) (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1303 
(1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206(4) (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 689A.417(1)(c) (Michie 
2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:4(IV) (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4(b) (Michie 2000); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-215(c)(1) (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.64(B)(2) (Anderson 2001); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3614.1(C)(2) (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135(3) (1999); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 38-93-20(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2703 (2000); TEX. INS. 
CODE ANN. § 21.73 Sec. 3(a) (Vernon 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4(B)(6) (Michie 2000); WIS. 
STAT. § 631.89(2)(d) (2000). 
 429. Only eight states prohibit considering information from a relative in determining rates. See 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-118(a)(1) (Michie 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2259(b)(4) 
(2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:213.7(b)(1) (West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 72A-139(4) (2000); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 689A.417(c)(2) (Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:4(IV) (2000); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2703 (2000); WIS. STAT. § 631.89(2)(d) (2000). 
 430. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4301(2)(b) (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-085(2)(b) 
(Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.7(B)(1) (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, 
§ 2159-C(2) (West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 72A-139(3) (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1303(1)(3) 
(1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 689A.417(1)(b) (Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2(II) 
(2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4(A) (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2703 (2000); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4(b) (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. § 631.89(2)(b) (2000). 
 431. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). 
 432. Eric Zicklin, More Employers Self-Insure Their Medical Plans Survey Finds, BUS. AND 
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The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 protects 
individuals from losing coverage when they change jobs.433 Under the Act, a 
new employer’s group health plan cannot deny coverage or apply preexisting 
condition exclusions for more than twelve months for any condition 
diagnosed or treated in the preceding twelve months.434 In addition, group 
health plans cannot establish eligibility for enrollment on the basis of health 
status, medical history, or genetic information.435  
The law is insufficient, however. It does not prohibit genetic 
discrimination against people seeking insurance under individual plans and 
denied or charged exorbitant premiums for coverage.436 Moreover, the law 
does not prohibit group insurers from charging higher rates to a whole group 
based on genetic information about a particular individual.437 
In the employment context, sixteen states prohibit conditioning 
employment on genetic testing.438 However, only a few states prohibit 
employment discrimination based on family history.439 At the federal level, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers with fifteen 
or more employees from refusing to hire or otherwise discriminate against 
people with disabilities or who are regarded as having disabilities (unless the 
disability impedes their ability to do the job in question).440 The ADA 
protects people whose disabilities have already manifested, yet are otherwise 
qualified to do the job.441 But there are questions about whether a genetic 
predisposition without any symptoms should be considered a disability. After 
much equivocating, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
(EEOC) provided guidance about how the ADA would apply to an 
HEALTH, Apr. 1992, at 74, available at NEXIS, Lexis Library, News Group File. 
 433. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (Supp. II 1996).  
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. § 300gg(b)(1)(B). 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. 
 438. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463(B)(4) (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(11)(B) (1999); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(a) (2000); IOWA CODE § 729.6(2)(b) (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
5, § 19302 (West 2000), MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1306(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-
H:3(I)(b) (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 2001); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1) (McKinney 
2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1A (2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3614.2(C)(1) (West 2000); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 659.036(1) (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1(a)(2) (2001); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 
§ 21.402(a) (Vernon 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9333(a) (2001); WIS. STAT. § 111.372(1)(b) 
(2000). 
 439. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(e) (2000); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 19302 (West 2000); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 2001); N.Y. EXEC. LAWS § 292 (21-d) (McKinney 2001) (prohibiting 
discrimination based on offspring’s test); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1A (2000). 
 440. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17 (1994). 
 441. Id. 
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individual who is presymptomatic for a genetic disease.442 According to the 
EEOC, it is illegal for an employer to discriminate against a person based on 
genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders.443 As an 
example, the EEOC indicated that an employer may not refuse to hire an 
individual simply because the person’s genetic profile reveals an increased 
susceptibility to colon cancer.444 Again, this interpretation may not go far 
enough. It does not specifically address a case in which someone is denied a 
job because he or she is a carrier of a recessive disorder, such as cystic 
fibrosis, and the potential employer does not want to pay the health care costs 
of potential affected children. Also, it does not prevent employers from 
performing genetic tests on employees, as was done in the Lawrence 
Berkeley Laboratory case. In that case, the California constitution had a 
particularly strong privacy provision, thus allowing the appellate court to 
condemn the procedure.445 In other states, employers may be legally able to 
test employees without their consent. In contrast, the fundamental rights 
approach would require greater protections. For example, the fundamental 
rights approach mandates disclosures about quality. In Virginia, IVF clinics 
must disclose their success rates.446 In other states, lengthy disclosures must 
be made about the medical and psychological backgrounds of proposed 
surrogate mothers.447  
A reason for the need for stronger regulation in the genetics area is that 
genetic testing is more prone to error than other scientific tests. Additionally, 
genetic testing can have such a profound impact on people and their most 
important life decisions and relationships, it should only be undertaken with 
advance knowledge and assurances of quality. 
The fundamental rights model would provide appropriate protections for 
people using genetic services, in contrast to the medical model and the public 
health model. The fundamental rights model would require that participation 
in genetic services was voluntary and that participants maintain control over 
their genetic information. Since the medical benefits of genetic testing are in 
many instances unproven, and there are potential psychological and social 
risks in genetic testing, the need for assurance that patients will make 
voluntary and informed decisions about participating in testing is particularly 
 442. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION ON THE 
DEFINITION OF THE TERM “DISABILITY” § 902.8(a) (1995). 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id. 
 445. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 446. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 (Michie 2000). 
 447. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16B-13:13, B:18 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 
(Michie 2000). 
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significant. The fundamental rights model would also require enhanced 
regulation to ensure quality assurance since the usual tort incentives for 
behaving nonnegligently are not operating with as great a force in genetics as 
they are in other medical areas.  
VII. LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS MODEL 
The medical model and the public health model would, in a de facto or de 
jure manner, require people to undergo certain forms of genetic testing. In 
contrast, the fundamental rights model would prevent people from being 
tested genetically without their consent. In addition, for people who undergo 
such services, only the fundamental rights model would be concerned with 
the impact of a third party’s use of an individual’s genetic information and 
would provide adequate assurance of quality. Consequently, in protecting 
voluntariness in testing, control over the use of one’s own genetic 
information, and accuracy of test results, the fundamental rights model most 
closely comports with people’s needs. 
Implementing the fundamental rights approach would require a careful 
consideration of the appropriate measures for protecting voluntariness, 
transmitting sufficient information for informed consent, and maintaining 
quality assurance. Existing legal doctrines would support many of these 
measures. New laws would be necessary in only a few instances, such as the 
protection against genetic discrimination. 
The common law right of bodily integrity448 and the right to refuse 
medical interventions449 could be used as the basis to forbid unauthorized 
genetic testing. If the testing is part of a state or federal program, additional 
constitutional protections come into play to protect the right to refuse the 
intervention such as privacy protection of certain personal information, 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, protections of bodily 
integrity, and protections of reproductive decision making and decisions 
regarding childrearing.450 
Medical information is protected as private, in part because of the 
psychological, social, and financial risks of its disclosure.451 Common law 
 448. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 
551 N.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.Y. 1990). 
 449. Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
 450. Equal protection concerns might be raised as well. Such testing might be considered 
discriminatory based on pregnancy or sex. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 451. See Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).  
Society’s moral judgment about the high-risk activities associated with the disease, including 
sexual relations and drug use, make the information of the most personal kind. Also, the privacy 
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privacy protections exist for certain types of medical information,452 as do 
federal constitutional protections.453 Some mandatory genetic testing would 
provide medical information about the woman or fetus to third parties (e.g., 
laboratory personnel or physicians), which could arguably be a breach of 
privacy if misused.454 Such testing would also violate the privacy right not to 
know medical information about oneself.455 In addition, the right of informed 
consent also includes a right to refuse medical information that is offered by 
physicians.456 
An individual could assert a Fourth Amendment right457 to refuse the 
collection of blood or other tissue for a genetic test that was mandated by law 
or undertaken by a government institution, such as a state university medical 
school. Mandatory blood testing is considered a search and seizure that must 
comply with Fourth Amendment standards which balance the nature and 
quality of the intrusion against the strength of the given state interest.458 
Under such an analysis, mandatory testing of an arrested individual’s blood 
for HIV infection has been found unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment.459 Similarly, mandatory HIV testing of state employees 
working with developmentally disabled clients was enjoined as an 
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment because the 
interest in one’s exposure to the AIDS virus is even greater than one’s privacy interest in ordinary 
medical records because of the stigma that attaches with the disease. 
Id. at 384. Genetic information raises a similar risk of stigma and discrimination. 
 452. See ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS, supra note 75, at 190-94  (discussing common law 
actions for breach of medical privacy including actions based on the tort of privacy, breach of contract, 
malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty). 
 453. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 
264 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 454. It has long been recognized that a blood sample contains more medical information than a 
traditional medical record. As Fred Bergmann of the National Institutes of Health stated:  
The genetic counselor takes a history and puts it in the computer bank. He also takes a blood 
sample and puts it in the deep freeze. And from the point of view of confidentiality, I would 
suggest that there is much more information in the deep freeze than in the computer bank, and I 
think that point should be appreciated by the lawyers and everyone else. 
Harold P. Green, Mechanisms for Public Policy Decision-Making, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN 
GENETICS: GENETIC COUNSELING AND THE USE OF GENETIC KNOWLEDGE 411 (Bruce Hilton et al. 
eds., 1973) (statement of F. Bergmann). 
 455. Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of HIV Blood Test Results to the Individual 
Tested: A Matter of Personal Choice Neglected, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 454-57 (1991); Martha A. 
Field, Pregnancy and AIDS, 52 MD. L. REV. 402, 409-13 (1993). 
 456. Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL 
MED. 163, 215-16 (1984). See also, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1976). 
 457. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 50-51 (1995). 
 458. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (holding that a blood test was 
permissible as a “minor intrusion”). 
 459. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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employees’ privacy interests outweighed the state’s interest in preventing 
clients from contracting AIDS from employees.460 
Not only is an individual’s body considered private territory, protected by 
constitutional law and tort law, the information generated through the use of 
genetic technologies is private as well. Yet, despite all the precedents 
protecting individual medical decision making, proponents of mandatory 
genetic testing (such as mandatory fetal cell sorting for pregnant women) 
might argue that the process only creates a minimal burden on an individual 
and thus should not be viewed as an infringement of a person’s constitutional 
rights. The view of a blood test as creating minimal burden is present in some 
Fourth Amendment cases.461 Moreover, the cases holding that pregnant 
women have a right to refuse Cesarean sections turned, in part, on the fact 
that such operations are extremely physically invasive. In In re A.C., for 
example, the court held that it was improper to order a Cesarean section on 
an unconsenting woman, but stated: “Our discussion of the circumstances, if 
any, in which the patient’s wishes may be overridden presupposes a major 
bodily invasion. We express no opinion with regard to the circumstances, if 
any, in which lesser invasions might be permitted . . . .”462 
However, even though some courts have viewed blood tests as 
insignificant, there is reason to believe that genetic tests using blood samples 
are different because the federal government treats them as different. While 
certain other blood tests used in federally funded research may be exempt 
from full review by the Institutional Review Board because they are viewed 
as entailing “minimal risks,”463 the federal Office of Protection from 
Research Risks has indicated that genetic tests using blood samples present 
greater than minimal risks due to the harmful psychological and social risks 
for tested individuals, including “stigmatization, discrimination, labelling, 
and potential loss of or difficulty in obtaining employment or insurance.”464 
Recognizing people’s right to refuse genetic testing is in keeping with a 
vast body of legal decisions. Cases dealing with informed consent,465 
fiduciary duty,466 the disposal of body parts,467 tissue transplantation,468 and 
 460. Glover v. E. Neb. Cmty. Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 461. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72. 
 462. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1246 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 
N.E.2d 326, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 463. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110 (1999). 
 464. OFFICE FOR PROTECTION FROM RESEARCH RISKS, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, PROTECTING 
HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK 5-45 (1993). 
 465. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 466. Id. 
 467. See, e.g., Browning v. Norton Children’s Hosp., 504 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1974). 
 468. See, e.g., Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990). 
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relatives’ rights to make decisions about a deceased person’s organs469 and 
tissues all create constraints on what researchers may do with tissue and what 
information they owe to their subjects and subjects’ relatives. Taken together, 
legal precedent indicates that patients are entitled to certain information 
before blood and tissue removal and testing. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The policy model we choose to oversee genetic testing and its resulting 
genetic information will be the caretaker of our values. Society faces the 
vexing question of how the fruits of genetic research should be used 
everyday. The task of developing policy in this field is similar to that of 
writing science fiction. We must envision our society under competing policy 
approaches. Studies of the actual impact of genetic services on individuals, 
groups, and society at large help us to evaluate the alternative futures that 
genetics may bring and guide individuals and society through the choices 
raised by genetics. 
 
 469. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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